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In the interests of full disclosure, I note that I know, have worked with, and have long
admired Laughlin McDonald, the author of the book that I am reviewing. One of the distinctive
aspects of the voting rights bar is the relationship among practicing lawyers, law professors, and
various social scientists. See infra text accompanying notes 58-67. To my mind, there is no field
of public law in which practice and scholarship - and practicing lawyers and full-time scholars-
more inform one another.
I take the title of this review from an Apache proverb that "it is better to have less thunder in
the mouth and more lightning in the hand." See John J. Lumpkin, Native American Veterans
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In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder,' the
Supreme Court expressed its faith that, because of the Voting Rights Act, "we
are now a very different Nation."' Few lawyers are more responsible for that
transformation than Laughlin McDonald, the longtime director of the
American Civil Liberties Union's voting rights project. In his most recent book,
American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights,' McDonald shows us,
however, that we are not quite as different as the Supreme Court might think.
In nearly every respect, full enfranchisement has come late to the descendants
of America's first inhabitants.'
When Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to
forbid practices that result in a denial or dilution of minority voting strength
regardless of the motivation behind them,' it directed courts to conduct "a
searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,"' taking into
account "the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question."'
McDonald's book, based on a series of section 2 cases that he and his colleagues
at the ACLU have litigated on behalf of Indian plaintiffs," takes a similar
approach, offering detailed descriptions of the barriers to full political equality
faced by Indians in communities in five Western states. 9
In many important respects, those barriers resemble the ones confronted by
blacks in the South and Latinos in the Southwest. Thus, many of McDonald's
individual chapters are organized around the presence of the "Senate factors"-
nine aspects of political and socioeconomic life that Congress distilled from
1. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
2. Id. at 2516.
3. LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS
(2010) [hereinafter McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS]. McDonald is also the author of an
exhaustive study of the battle for voting equality in Georgia, LAUGHLIN McDONALD, A
VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT IN GEORGIA (2003), as well as several
book chapters and scholarly articles.
4. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 45.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 5 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
6. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)).
7. Id. at 27.
8. McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at vi-viui.
9. McDonald's book thus complements another recent study of Indian voting rights, DANIEL
MCCOOL, SUSAN M. OLSON & JENNIFER L. ROBINSON, NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS,
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT To VOTE (2007), which contains several case
studies -some overlapping with McDonald's -as well as a systematic canvass of voting
rights cases involving Indians. See id. at 48-67 tbl. 3.1, 68 tbl-3.2.
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those voting rights cases as "probative" of section 2 violations.o In particular,
McDonald describes, in detail both painstaking and painful to read, a history of
exclusion and a level of ongoing polarization that rivals Mississippi or the Rio
Grande Valley. If anything, South Carolina seems further along the path to
political equality than South Dakota."
McDonald and his colleagues brought to their voting cases involving
Indian plaintiffs a doctrinal framework and a set of litigation techniques honed
in cases involving African-Americans. But, as McDonald explains, Indians
occupy a distinctive status within the American political order.1 2 Indians are
citizens not only of the United States and the state where they reside but often
also (and particularly in those regions where they are most likely to bring
voting rights claims) of a separate sovereign as well-their tribe. This fact has
inflected both the history of Indian disenfranchisement and the course of
litigation under the Voting Rights Act.
Indian tribes, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, "are 'distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in
matters of local self-government."" Thus, like all political communities, they
confront questions of membership, allocation of power, and political structure.
This Review explores these questions of disenfranchisement, dilution, and
constitutional design. Part I describes the history of Indian disenfranchisement
in light of their distinctive status. Indians' exclusion from the political process
reflected profound racism as pernicious and pervasive as the discrimination
facing blacks in the South and Latinos in the Southwest. But it also involved
complex constitutional and conceptual issues unique to Indians. Part II then
turns to the relatively recent vote dilution litigation that forms the heart of
McDonald's book. Indian voting rights cases have followed a clear path blazed
io. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29; see infra note 63 (listing the nine factors).
ii. McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 140 (stating that although many covered
jurisdictions in the South did not comply with section 5, "in none was the failure as
deliberate and prolonged as in South Dakota"); see id. at 122-47 (discussing South Dakota's
continued resistance to the Voting Rights Act). For examples of McDonald's work in South
Carolina, see McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984) (holding that jurisdictions seeking
preclearance of election-related changes under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act must make
unambiguous submissions of the changes involved); and United States v. Charleston Cnty.,
365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding a section 2 violation with respect to the county's use of
at-large elections).
12. McDONALD, AMEIPCAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 3-29 (describing the volatile and
contradictory nature of the United States's approach to the political status of Indians and
tribes).
13. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
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by earlier cases involving blacks and Latinos. Nevertheless, themes related to
Indians' distinctive political status crop up within the litigation at various
points. Finally, Part III looks beyond Indians' claims under the Voting Rights
Act to discuss issues related to internal tribal elections. Like other elections,
these contests involve fundamental questions about enfranchisement and
electoral design. Tribal answers to these questions sometimes depart
dramatically from the rules governing federal, state, and local elections in ways
that tie into ongoing debates extending far beyond Indian law.
1. INDIAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE FIGHT FOR ENFRANCHISEMENT
On April 6, 188o, the city of Omaha, Nebraska, was set to hold elections for
its city council. John Elk, a city resident, showed up shortly before Election Day
at the registrar's office seeking to have his name placed on the voting rolls. The
registrar, Charles Wilkins, refused Elk's request on the grounds that Elk was
an Indian. Elk sued Wilkins in federal district court, seeldng $6ooo in damages
for violation of his constitutional right to vote.
The Supreme Court held, however, that Elk could not invoke the Fifteenth
Amendment's protection against racial discrimination in voting 4 because that
protection extended to "citizens of the United States," and Elk was not a
citizen. The case turned on the Citizenship Clause in section i of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That clause-so much in the news these days with
anti-immigrant hysteria over purported "anchor babies" provides that "[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." 6 Elk's position was that, having "severed his tribal relation" by
moving off the reservation into white society and having thus "fully and
completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States,"' 7 he
was a citizen.
The Court disagreed. Noting that "Indians not taxed" -essentially, Indians
living on tribal lands -had been excluded from the population base for
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § i ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.").
15. See Editorial, Xenophobia: Fear-Mongering for American Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at
A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo/o8/o6/opinion/o6fril.html.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, cl. i.
17. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) (quoting from Elk's complaint). McDonald discusses
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apportioning seats in the House of Representatives under the original
Constitution,' the Court reiterated the longstanding view that Indians were
members of "distinct political communities," owing "immediate allegiance to
their several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States."' 9
The Court then concluded that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not change that essential fact. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which became the basis for the Fourteenth Amendment, had defined as citizens
"all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed."2 o The Court saw no significance to the omission
of that exclusionary language from the Citizenship Clause, particularly given
the continued exclusion of Indians not taxed from the basis for apportionment
in section 2 of the Amendment. Since Indians living on tribal lands thus did
not become U.S. citizens at birth, they could obtain citizenship only through
naturalization. Naturalization could be accomplished only with the consent of
the federal government, and not by the unilateral act of an individual Indian
who decided to separate himself from his tribe. Elk had not been naturalized;
he had simply moved to Omaha. The Court thus concluded that Elk, "not
being a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, has been deprived of no right secured by the Fifteenth
Amendment."
Justice Harlan's dissent did not dispute the proposition that Indians who
remained affiliated with their tribe were not citizens of the United States unless
the United States conferred citizenship on them wholesale.' Rather, he argued
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. That Clause also required that direct taxes be apportioned
among the several states on the same basis and contained the infamous Three-Fifths Clause.
19. Elk, 112 U.S. at 99.
20. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, there has
been no constitutional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned. The other remaining
provision in the Constitution that deals expressly with Indians is the Indian Commerce
Clause. Id. art. I, S 8, cl. 3 (conferring power on Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce ... with
the Indian Tribes").
22. See Elk, 112 U.S. at 1o6-07 (stating that "whether any Indian tribes, or any members
thereof' should be "admitted to the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship, is a
question to be decided by the nation whose wards they are and whose citizens they seek to
become, and not by each Indian for himself').
23. Id. at 109.
24. Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As the majority pointed out, contemporaneous with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government had entered into treaties
with a number of tribes, naturalizing their members. See id. at 103-05 (majority opinion)
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only that the two prerequisites for citizenship in section 1-first, that the
person be either born or naturalized in the United States and, second, that he
be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof'-did not have to be fulfilled
simultaneously. The Citizenship Clause, he argued, "implies in respect of
persons born in this country, that they may claim the rights of national
citizenship from and after the moment they become subject to the complete
jurisdiction of the United States." 2 Quoting Judge Thomas Cooley's edition of
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, he noted
that when
the tribal relations are dissolved, when the headship of the chief or the
authority of the tribe is no longer recognized, and the individual
Indian, turning his back upon his former mode of life, makes himself a
member of the civilized community, the case [under the Fourteenth
Amendment] is wholly altered. He then no longer acknowledges a
divided allegiance; he joins himself to the body politic... .
Indians were entitled to national citizenship when they "abandon[ed]" their
tribe and became residents of one of the states. Otherwise,
the Fourteenth Amendment has wholly failed to accomplish, in respect
of the Indian race, what, we think, was intended by it; and there is still
in this country a despised and rejected class of persons, with no
nationality whatever; who, born in our territory . . . are yet not
members of any political community nor entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States.
Even under Justice Harlan's view, then, Indians would be entitled to invoke the
Fifteenth Amendment's protection of their right to vote only if they severed
their ties with the Indian community."
(describing treaties with the Delaware, the Pottawatomie, the Sioux, the Ottawa, the Miami,
the Peoria, the Winnebago in Minnesota, and the Stockbridge and Munsee in Wisconsin).
25. Id. at 121 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 120 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 1933, at 655 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873)).
27. Id. at 122-23.
28. Congress took a similar position. For example, the 1889 Enabling Act under which
Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota gained admission to the Union,
provided that the states' constitutions "shall be republican in form, and make no distinction
in civil or political rights on account of race or color, except as to Indians not taxed." Act of
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 18o, § 4, 25 Stat. 676-77.
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That general view prevailed as a matter of federal law for the next forty
years. The Dawes and Burke Acts conferred citizenship on the majority of
Indians," but only because they agreed to the division of their lands
("allotment"), left the reservation, or cut their ties to their tribes. As McDonald
trenchantly observes, "Indians became citizens, but only by ceasing to be
Indians."3o
After a series of additional partial measures," Congress enacted the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, unconditionally conferring U.S. citizenship on all
Indians." Thus, as a formal matter, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments' protections of voting rights finally were extended to Indians.
But as with African-Americans, whose formal right to vote had been
recognized a half-century earlier by those same Amendments,
disenfranchisement remained pervasive. States with large Indian populations
used a variety of devices to keep Indians off the rolls. Some of these devices
found their parallels in the techniques used to disenfranchise blacks and
Latinos." For example, the literacy tests that black and Latino citizens failed
29. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 15.
30. Id. at 16. More precisely, Indians could achieve citizenship only to the extent that they
appeared to nonnative eyes to have abandoned their identity. Many Indians continued to
observe their traditions in private even once they had moved into nonnative society.
31. For example, in 1919, Congress conferred eligibility for citizenship on Indians who had
served honorably in World War I. Id. at 18. For discussion of the relationship between
military service and citizenship, see Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional
History of the Right To Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345 (2003). See also MCCOOL ET AL., supra
note 9, at 17 (noting that, in its 1948 brief attacking Arizona's law denying on-reservation
Indians the right to vote, the United States argued that Indians who had served in the
military during World War II "rightly resented a situation where they are allowed to
participate in upholding democratic principles as soldiers, but are considered unprepared to
share in protecting those principles in peace time" (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of the
United States of America at 7, Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (No. 5065))).
32. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 ("Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all noncitizen
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby,
declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, That the granting of such citizenship
shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other
property."). The current version is codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1401 (2006), which provides that
persons "born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other
aboriginal tribe" shall be "nationals and citizens of the United States at birth." This
unilateral declaration was controversial among some Indian populations who feared that it
was yet another measure designed to force their assimilation. See infra note 102.
33. Compare Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (striking down a restrictive Oklahoma re-
registration requirement designed to perpetuate disenfranchisement of blacks after the
Supreme Court had struck down the state's grandfather clause), with McDONALD,
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often barred Indians too. 4 In the course of explaining why Congress had the
power to suspend Arizona's literacy test,3s Justice Brennan's opinion described
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 272 n.87 (referring to a Montana re-registration
requirement that blunted the impact of the Indian Citizenship Act). Compare Miss. State
Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that
Mississippi's dual registration requirement, which necessitated that aspiring voters travel to
the county courthouse to register, violated the Voting Rights Act because of its disparate
impact on black citizens), affd sub nom. Miss. State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Mabus,
932 F.2d 400 ( 5th Cir. 1991), with McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 123
(describing South Dakota's restrictive registration practices, including its requirement that
voters register in person at the office of the county auditor).
34. See McCOOL ET AL., supra note 9, at 18-19 (discussing the impact of literacy tests on
Indians); see also MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 36-37 (discussing
congressional references to this history).
35. In 1965, Congress suspended literacy tests for five years in jurisdictions with depressed
levels of political participation. The coverage formula that Congress used to designate the
jurisdictions swept in most of the states in the Deep South, Alaska, and a few jurisdictions
elsewhere. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 31. Three counties in
Arizona with large Indian populations were covered by this initial ban. See Apache Cnty. v.
United States, 256 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.D.C. 1966).
Congress permitted jurisdictions to "bail out" from under the Act's coverage if they
could show that for the preceding five years their test had been administered without a
discriminatory purpose or effect. See McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 31.
Arizona sought to bail out and, over the objection of Navajo voters who sought
unsuccessfully to intervene, a three-judge court entered an order permitting the counties to
bail out. See Apache Cnty., 256 F. Supp. at 913. Although the court took note of "past and
present inadequacies of facilities" for registering and for voting on reservations, id. at 910, it
found that the state was making appropriate efforts to remedy the problems. And the court
described the Arizona literacy test as "bona fide." Id. Ironically, one piece of evidence on
which the court relied to refute the Navajos' challenge was the fact that the test had been
adopted during the period in which Indians were disenfranchised because they were not
citizens. Id. at 910-11 & n.11. Even more ironically, the court downplayed the efforts of the
Tribe's voting chairman to persuade the federal government to send registrars to the
reservation under a provision of the 1965 Act that permitted such registrars in cases where
significant complaints were made:
[Lloyd House, Deputy Registrar and Voting Chairman of the Tribe,] wrote to
Attorney General Katzenbach on August 27, 1965, asking for Federal registrars,
explaining the failure to supply 20 letters from Navajos denied registration as
follows: "Our people are not capable in many instances of writing letters and
because voting rights have been so meaningless for the past two (2) or three (3)
decades, the people are not aware of the importance of this freedom of the
American people." The inability to file 20 letters is plainly consistent with
plaintiffs allegations [that there was no discrimination against Indian voters], if
indeed it does not affirmatively support them.
Id. at 912 n.15-
In 1970, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to extend the suspension of literacy
tests for another five years and to impose the ban nationwide. Arizona refused to abandon
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the high level of illiteracy among Indians as "the consequence of a previous,
governmentally sponsored denial of equal educational opportunity," pointing
to the state's admission that "many older Indians in the State were 'never
privileged to attend a formal school."' 6 Justice Douglas went further,
describing literacy tests as "a discriminatory weapon against some minorities,
not only Negroes but Americans of Mexican ancestry, and American Indians.""
In 1975, recognizing the barriers to full participation that Indians continued to
confront, Congress not only permanently prohibited literacy tests throughout
the United States but also expressly included Indians within the Voting Rights
Act's special protections for minority groups."
its test, and the United States sued a number of states, including Arizona, whose literacy test
it sought to enjoin. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
36. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 234 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting
Hearings on Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 91st Cong., ist and 2d Sess. (1969-1970) (statement
of Att'y Gen. of Ariz.)). Because the case involved so many issues, there was no opinion for
the Court. See also id. at 132 (opinion of Black, J.) (pointing to the discriminatory impact of
Arizona's test on Latinos and Indians).
37. Id. at 147 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Literacy tests were racially
discriminatory not only because they perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination in the
educational system but also because they were often administered in a discriminatory
fashion. See David Wilkins, An Inquiry into Indigenous Political Participation: Implications for
Tribal Sovereignty, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 732, 738-39 (2000) (quoting the Cherokee
Indian superintendent's observation with respect to North Carolina's literacy test, which
required that aspiring voters show, "to the satisfaction of the registrar," that they were able
to read and write a section of the U.S. Constitution, that "[w]e have had Indian graduates of
Carlisle, Haskell and other schools in instances much better educated than the registrar
himself, turned down because they did not read or write to his satisfaction").
The literacy test ban was made permanent in 1975. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(a)-(b) (20o6)
(providing that citizens cannot be denied the right to vote because of "failure to comply with
any test or device" and defining "test or device" to include, among other things, "any
requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, [or]
(2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject").
38. Indians and Alaskan Natives - as well as Latinos and Asian-Americans - are protected by the
Voting Rights Act as language minorities, rather than as racial groups. The Act uses the
terms "language minorities" and "language minority group" to mean "persons who are
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage," id. § 19731(c)(3),
regardless of whether those persons actually speak a language other than English. Section
4(f)(2) of the Act provides that "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because
he is a member of a language minority group." Id. § 19 73b(f) (2).
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or political subdivision from using a
voting practice "which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
1429
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But in addition to confronting the same exclusionary practices that black
and Latino citizens faced, Indians encountered unique barriers, as states used
Indians' distinctive status to defeat their right to vote. Many states formally
disenfranchised "Indians not taxed,"" by which they meant Indians living on
reservations or other federal land that was not subject to property taxes. 40 The
ostensible justification for this exclusion was "no representation without
taxation"': individuals who did not contribute to the government's revenue
should not be entitled to influence how that revenue was spent. Even on its
own terms, the bar was overbroad: Indians had no exemption from a wide
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 19 73 b(f)(2)." Id. § 1973(a). Similarly, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act-
which applies only to specified jurisdictions, including several with large Indian populations
(most notably, the states of Alaska and Arizona and two counties in South Dakota, see
28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2009)) -contains a similar prohibition on those jurisdictions' making
any change to their election laws unless they can show that the change "neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title."
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
In addition to these provisions, many jurisdictions with significant Indian populations
are covered by section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-ia, which requires
the provision of bilingual ballot materials in jurisdictions with a significant number of
citizens of voting age with limited English proficiency. For a list of jurisdictions required to
provide minority-language voting assistance to Indian populations, see McDONALD,
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 46.
39. Id. at 19 (noting that Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Washington used this
formulation).
40. The poll tax was a major disenfranchising device in the South. See, e.g., Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (striking down Virginia's poll tax for federal elections
because it was enacted and maintained for racially discriminatory reasons); J. MORGAN
KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICs: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE RISE OF
THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 63-72 (1974) (discussing the poll tax). The rationale
for disenfranchising Indians was a bit different: it was not their failure to pay a tax that was
owed but rather their exemption from certain taxation to begin with. In fact, states made no
real effort to collect the poll tax, as opposed to taxes on income or property; the point of the
poll tax was to make it harder to vote, and not really to raise revenue. See, e.g., VIRGINIA
FOSTER DURR, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA FOSTER
DURR 176-78 (Hollinger F. Barnard ed., 1985) (describing her difficulties in attempting to
pay Virginia's poll tax).
41. See Prince v. Bd. of Educ., 543 P.2d 1176, 1178 (N.M. 1975) (describing this argument in the
context of a suit in which non-Indian plaintiffs sought to invalidate a school district bond
election on the grounds that on-reservation Navajo should not have voted because they did
not pay the property taxes used to repay the bonds); see also In re Liquor Election, 163 N.W.
988, 990 (Minn. 1917) (stating that it would be "repugnant to our form of government" for
"those who do not come within the operation of the laws of the state" to "have the power to
make and impose laws upon others" and charging that "[t]he tribal Indian contributes
nothing to the state").
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range of state and local taxes, most notably state and local sales taxes for off-
reservation purchases and real estate taxes for land held in fee simple.
Moreover, the disqualification was expressly racial in character: none of these
states disqualified whites who were not subject to property taxes.42
Sometimes, the argument was offered at one remove, taking the form that
on-reservation Indians were not really residents of the state or any political
subdivisions within which the reservation was located. In Allen v. Merell, 4 for
example, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the state's treatment of on-
reservation Indians as nonresidents' on the theory that they were both
potentially subject to disproportionate "influence and control" by federal
officials-a justification reminiscent of pauper disqualification provisions -
and "much less concerned with paying taxes and otherwise being involved with
state government and its local units" than other citizens.46 The Utah court
42. MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 19. In 1938, the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior issued an opinion that "the Fifteenth Amendment clearly prohibits any denial
of the right to vote to Indians under circumstances in which non-Indians would be
permitted to vote." Jeanette Wolfley, Jim Crow, Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement ofNative
Americans, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 167, 185 (1991) (quoting the opinion). Nevertheless it took
several decades to vindicate this principle. For example, in 1948, a three-judge district court
struck down New Mexico's disenfranchisement of on-reservation Indians as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment:
Any other citizen, regardless of race, in the State of New Mexico who has not paid
one cent of tax of any kind or character, if he possesses the other qualifications,
may vote. An Indian, and only an Indian, in order to meet the qualifications to
vote must have paid a tax. How you can escape the conclusion that makes a
requirement with respect to an Indian as a qualification to exercise the elective
franchise and does not make that requirement with respect to the member of any
race is beyond me.
Id. at 185-86 (quoting from the unpublished district court opinion in Trujillo v. Garley, No.
1353 (D.N.M. 1948)).
43. 305 P.2d 490 (Utah 1956).
44. The provision of the Utah election code at issue declared that "[a]ny person living upon any
Indian or military reservation shall not be deemed a resident of Utah within the meaning of
this chapter, unless such person had acquired a residence in some county in Utah prior to
taking up his residence upon such Indian or military reservation." Id. at 491 (quoting the
now-repealed provision). The U.S. Supreme Court struck down such provisions with
respect to military personnel in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). For a wonderful
discussion of Carrington, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 8-13 (1969).
45. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 21-22 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing
the pauper exclusions and the idea that individuals receiving government assistance might
be subject to undue influence).
46. Allen, 305 P.2d at 492.
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unselfconsciously expressed its alarm at the prospect that Indians might
actually influence election outcomes:
[I]n a county where the Indian population would amount to a
substantial proportion of the citizenery [sic], or may even outnumber
the other inhabitants, allowing them to vote might place substantial
control of the county government and the expenditures of its funds in a
group of citizens who, as a class, had an extremely limited interest in its
functions and very little responsibility in providing the financial
support thereof."
Arizona adopted perhaps the most ingeniously disingenuous explanation
for its disenfranchisement of on-reservation Indians. The state acknowledged
that Indians living within its boundaries were residents. But Arizona's
constitution (like the constitutions of many other states both then and now)
denied the right to vote to resident citizens who were "under guardianship,
non compos mentis, or insane.""4 Exploiting Chief Justice John Marshall's
description of the relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal
Government as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian,"o the state
supreme court declared that individual Indians were therefore "persons under
guardianship" and ineligible to vote." It took a generation for the Arizona
courts to repudiate that view, acknowledge that individual Indians were
entirely competent to manage their own affairs, and admit that Chief Justice
Marshall's metaphor should never have been taken literally."
47. Id. at 495. This statement echoes V.O. Key's famous backlash hypothesis that resistance to
black enfranchisement increases as the black share of the population goes up. See V.0. KEY,
JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 315-16 (1949); James E. Alt, The Impact of the
Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN
THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 351, 359-60, 370-71
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]
(offering more recent empirical support).
The Utah legislature repealed the provision while the case was on appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. See McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 20. On the other hand,
as late as 1966, Colorado's legislature took the position that Indians living on reservations
were not residents of the state for purposes of voting. Id. at 149.
48. Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411, 415 (Ariz. 1928). For a contemporaneous analysis of the opinion,
see N.D. Houghton, The Legal Status of Indian Suffrage in the United States, 19 CALIF. L. REV.
507 (1931).
49. ARIz. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
50. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
51. Porter, 271 P. at 415-18.
52. See Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 463 (Ariz. 1948) (overruling Porter).
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Even after states repealed-or were forced by federal law to abandon-
outright disenfranchisement of Indians, Indian registration and voting rates
remained low. The repeal of literacy tests nonetheless left in place the use of
monolingual election materials that posed difficulties to Indians who
communicated primarily in their native tongues and had only limited English
proficiency." Jurisdictions' indifference or hostility resulted in restrictive
registration practices,54 a lack of accessible polling places," harassment of
Indian voters, 6  and depressed participation. Even beyond these first-
generation problems," Indians faced significant difficulties in electing the
53. See McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 62-63 (discussing language usage
among Crows and Northern Cheyennes in Montana). One indication of the depth and
breadth of the problem: the federal government subsequently required eighty jurisdictions
with substantial Indian populations to provide bilingual (or multilingual) ballot materials
under a provision requiring such materials for political subdivisions that contain "all or any
part of an Indian reservation," where more than five percent of the voting age population
"are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient," and where
the illiteracy rate among Indians is above the national illiteracy rate. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-
ia(b)(2)(A) (20o6). See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 46 (listing these
jurisdictions).
54. For example, South Dakota required aspiring voters who did not pay property taxes to
register in person at the county auditor's office. (Property taxpayers were automatically
registered.) The in-person requirement posed two difficulties. First, getting to the county
seat from the reservation was difficult for Indians who lacked transportation. Second, South
Dakota classified three counties in which a majority of the residents were Indian as
"unorganized" counties. Aspiring voters in these counties had to travel to the next county to
register. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 123.
Along the same lines, Montana restricted eligibility to serve as a deputy registrar of
voters to "taxpaying" residents of a precinct. Id. at 61. The state did not repeal this
provision, which had the effect of denying Indians "access to voter registration in their own
precincts on the reservation," until 1975. Id.
55. See McCOOL ET AL., supra note 9, at 72-73 (discussing cases involving the number or location
of polling places); MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 127 (residents of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation had to travel up to 150 miles roundtrip to vote until a
federal court ordered the establishment of polling places on the reservation in 19 86).
56. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 82-83 (discussing problems in Big
Horn County, Montana).
57. Voting rights scholars have identified three generations of voting rights claims. See, e.g.,
LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 32-33, 49 (1994); Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
Editors' Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 3, 14-15; Pamela S. Karlan,
Democracy and Dis-Appointment, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1274-76 (1995); Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-19 (1993).
The first generation involves challenges to outright denial of access, either to registration
rolls or voting booths. The second generation involves claims of vote dilution. The third
involves questions of governance and the allocation of power among elected officials.
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candidates of their choice. Those second-generation claims, and the operation
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, form the heart of McDonald's book.
11. INDIAN VOTERS AND THE FIGHT FOR REPRESENTATION
One striking feature of voting rights law is the way in which scholarship
and practice contribute to one another. The leading empirical study of the
Voting Rights Act, Quiet Revolution in the South,s8 contains a series of state-level
studies jointly written by lawyers who litigated many of the most significant
cases and various social scientists, many of whom participated in cases as
expert witnesses." Despite Judge Harry Edwards' much-discussed complaint
that scholars are no longer writing for practitioners and that courts are no
longer reading what scholars write,6 o that is not true with respect to voting
rights.6 1
Moreover, Indian citizens continue to face first-generation problems. For one recent
example, see Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-095, 2010 WL 4226614 (D.N.D.
Oct. 21, 2010) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing a county from closing polling
places on a reservation given the problems that Indian voters would then face in casting
their ballots).
In jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act's special preclearance requirement, see
supra note 38, the prohibition on administering any change to voting-related laws without
first satisfying federal authorities that the change has neither a discriminatory purpose nor a
discriminatory effect can serve as an important safeguard against new forms of
disenfranchisement.
58. QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 47.
5g. McDonald, along with political scientist Michael B. Binford and Ken Johnson (the deputy
director of the Southern Regional Council), contributed the chapter on Georgia. Laughlin
McDonald, Michael B. Binford & Ken Johnson, Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note
47, at 67.
6o. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
61. The Supreme Court has cited work by law professors in several voting-related cases. See,
e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) (quoting
Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pi~falls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 208
(2007)); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1242 (2009) (citing Richard H. Pildes, Is
Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself Social Science and Voting Rights in the 20005, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539 (2002)); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 515 (2007)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1999)); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 279 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RIcHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCEss 886 (2d ed. 2002)).
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Perhaps the most striking example of this close relationship is the
framework that the Supreme Court imposed on section 2 vote dilution cases.
When Congress amended section 2, it directed courts to engage in a totality-of-
the-circumstances inquiry. And it provided a list of nine factors probative of a
section 2 violation.63 In its first case interpreting the amended section 2,
For examples, in addition to McDonald's work, of important voting rights scholarship
written by practicing lawyers, see FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL
EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 (1990); James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon
Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 How. L.J. 633 (1996); James U.
Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the
White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifieenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982); Armand
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right To Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 525-44 (1973); and
Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 249
(Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
Law school faculty with extensive litigation experience have produced important work
explicitly based on prior litigation. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A
CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1998); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG,
FREE AT LAST To VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007).
Finally, and not surprisingly, social scientists who serve as expert witnesses in voting
rights cases have also produced extensive scholarship, sometimes based in part on their
litigation experience. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999); MCCOOL ET
AL., supra note 9; QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 47; Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J.
Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 SOC.
SC. Q 388 (1991); Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel & Richard L. Cole, Cumulative
Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case ofAlamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. &
POL. 469 (1989).
62. 42 U.S.C. S 19 7 3 (b) (20o6) (providing that a violation of section 2 "is established if, based
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that" minority citizens "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice").
63. The nine factors are:
I. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
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Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court substituted a relatively objective
three-prong test for the more fluid totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry:
While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be
relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in
multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following
circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not
impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their
choice. Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually be able to
defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group. . . . First, the minority group must be able to
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district. . . . Second, the
minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive....
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of
special circumstances . . . -usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.6
The Gingles test was lifted, almost verbatim, from an article by two veteran
voting rights lawyers, Jim Blacksher and Larry Menefee,16 who had litigated
the case that prompted the amendment of section 2, City ofMobile v. Bolden.
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction....
[8.] whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is
tenuous.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982). The factors were derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), as analyzed in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976).
64. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
6s. Id. at 48-51 (footnotes omitted).
66. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 61, at 51 (arguing that dilution occurs "when
jurisdiction-wide elections permit a bloc-voting majority, over a substantial period of time,
consistently to defeat candidates publicly identified with the interests of and supported by a
politically cohesive, geographically insular racial or ethnic minority group" (emphasis
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The vote dilution cases on which McDonald focuses were all litigated
within the doctrinal framework established in Gingles. Courts first determine
whether plaintiffs can establish the three Gingles preconditions and only then
consider the remaining Senate Report factors." Over time, as courts have
grown increasingly skeptical of vote dilution claims-largely, I believe, on
normative grounds having to do with a distaste for discussions of racial justice,
rather than on empirical grounds-the Gingles prongs have become more
restrictive. For example, the Supreme Court recently held that plaintiffs must
prove that they constitute "more than 5o percent of the voting-age population in
the relevant geographic area," 6' and several circuits have gone further by
requiring that plaintiffs prove the possibility of a single-member district in
which members of the minority group would be a majority of the citizens of
voting age.7o Courts also seem more amenable to accepting defendants'
omitted)). In the following pages of their article, Blacksher and Menefee tease out the
various strands of this requirement. Justice Brennan's opinion in Gingles cites the article a
dozen times.
67. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
68. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1241 (2009) (plurality opinion) ("In a § 2 case, only
when a party has established the Gingles requirements does a court proceed to analyze
whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances."). The second
Senate factor-"the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized" -is in many ways a shorthand for the second and third
prongs of the Gingles test. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29.
McDonald and I worked together, along with several colleagues, on an amicus brief in
Bartlett. See Motion for Leave To File Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (No. 07-689). McDonald volunteered to take on the
daunting task of summarizing all of the voting rights litigation in North Carolina since 1982,
along with reviewing all of the Department of Justice's North Carolina objection letters.
69. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 124s (emphasis added).
70. See Negr6n v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F. 3d 1563, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1997) (directing courts
to consider the citizen voting-age population in evaluating the first prong of the Gingles
test); Campos v. City of Hous., 113 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Romero v. City of
Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). The "CVAP" requirement has its
biggest bite in cases involving Latinos, whose population is both younger and more likely to
contain recent noncitizen immigrants than other groups. Cf Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d
763, 773 nn.4-5 (9th Cir. 1990) (showing that in Los Angeles County, the most heavily
Latino supervisory district had roughly thirty percent fewer citizens of voting age than the
most heavily Anglo district, even though the most heavily Anglo district had a slightly
smaller population).
The defendants in one of the cases that McDonald discusses -Stabler v. County of
Thurston, which involved a section 2 challenge to a county commission election system in
Nebraska- actually went still further: they argued that because Indian turnout was
depressed, Indians would need a population supermajority of around seventy-five percent in
order to be an effective voting majority and contended that the plaintiffs' inability to draw
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alternative explanations for differences in voting patterns.7' For example, in
one of the cases that McDonald discusses - Cottier v. City of Martin 72 - the en
banc Eighth Circuit recently held that, despite the fact that Indians had never
been able to elect a representative from the Indian community to the city
council, the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the third Gingles precondition. To
reach this conclusion, the court looked to exogenous elections'-in this case,
elections for offices other than the Martin City Council-and to elections in
which no Indian candidates had run.7 ' The court acknowledged that Indian
such a district should be a defense to liability. The district court rejected that argument. See
McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 193.
71. One of the primary arguments that courts have accepted is that the minority group is unable
to elect its candidates for political, rather than racial, reasons. I have explained elsewhere
why I think that this position is incorrect both theoretically and empirically. See Pamela S.
Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Diferent, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1996). Perhaps
exploiting the Supreme Court's statement in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), that a
Bureau of Indian Affairs' hiring preference for Indians was political rather than "racial," id.
at 553-54, defendants are apparently beginning to argue in Indian cases that Indians are
losing elections for political reasons. For a discussion of this issue, see Carole Goldberg, Not
So Simple: Voting Rights for American Indians in State Elections, 7 ELECTION L.J. 355, 359
(2008) (reviewing MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 9).
But precisely because tribes are political entities, intertribal political conflict can occur.
See, e.g., Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D. Ariz.
1992) (discussing the decision to place Navajo and Hopi populations in Arizona in separate
congressional districts), afd, 507 U.S. 981 (1993); cf Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G.
Diaz, The 199o New York City Districting Commission: Renewed Opportunity for Participation in
Local Government or Race-Based Gerrymandering?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1175, 1211 (1993)
(discussing councilmanic redistricting in New York and the conflict between Dominicans
and Puerto Ricans in upper Manhattan and between American-born and Caribbean-born
blacks in Brooklyn).
72. 604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 598 (Nov. 15, 2010). The case
involved a challenge to the three districts used to elect the Martin City Council. Although
nearly forty-five percent of the city's population was Native American, the Indian
community was "fragmented" among the three districts, each of which had a white
majority. McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 141-42.
73. Id. at 142.
74. "'Exogenous' elections are any elections other than the elections for the offices at issue."
Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749, 760 (N.D. Ga. 1997). "'Endogenous'
elections are elections for the offices that are at issue in the litigation." Id.
Courts look at exogenous elections when there are not enough endogenous elections -
that is, elections for the office at issue -to get a reliable sense of whether there is racially
polarized voting. In looking at the exogenous elections, courts ask how the candidates fared
within the jurisdiction under review. For example, a court might ask how Indian and non-
Indian candidates for countywide office or state legislative office performed within Martin.
75. See Cottier, 604 F.3d at 560.
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candidates generally lost"6 but concluded that, when the white-on-white
contests were added to the ledger, the results "taken as a whole show almost
equal numbers of victories for Indian-preferred candidates and non-Indian-
preferred candidates. They do not compel a finding that a white majority in
Martin votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the Indian-preferred
candidate."" To paraphrase McDonald's observation that Indians became
citizens only by ceasing to be Indians, 7 it seems that they can now elect the
candidates of their choice, but only as long as Indians don't run.
But the more depressing conclusion comes not from the cases that Indians
are losing, but from the cases that they are winning. The picture that emerges
from McDonald's accounts of litigation in Montana, South Dakota, Colorado,
Nebraska, and Wyoming is that usually it is all too straightforward to establish
liability in the relatively few communities that have significant Indian
populations.
76. See id. The plaintiffs in Cottier were somewhat hamstrung in analyzing the city council
elections because the city used only three precincts, each coterminous with one of the
councilmanic districts. Thus, the usual statistical techniques for determining voting
behavior were unavailable. The plaintiffs did present testimony suggesting that the Indian-
preferred candidate had lost in all seven contests conducted under the challenged plan, See
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Cottier, No. 10-335 (filed Sept. 1, 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 598 (2010).
77. Cottier, 604 F.3d at 56o (citing Johnson v. Hamrick, 296 F.3d 1o65, 1078 (iith Cir. 2002)
(stating that while courts "may give more weight to elections involving [minority]
candidates than those involving all white contestants, there is no requirement that a district
court must do so" (alteration in original))).
78. See supra text accompanying note 30.
79. In the 2000 census, nationwide roughly 4.1 million people identified themselves as
American Indians or Alaska Natives. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND
AsSKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2000, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2002pubs/c2kbrol-15.pdf. Nationwide, Indians and Alaska Natives make up
approximately one and a half percent of the population.
A group's political power is, of course, substantially a function of its size. At the
statewide level, there are only three states-Alaska (nineteen percent), Oklahoma (eleven
percent), and New Mexico (ten percent) -where Indians or Alaska Natives make up at least
ten percent of the population. At the county level, Indians or Alaska Natives constitute a
majority of the population in fourteen counties within Alaska, Arizona, Montana, and Utah
and in twelve counties within South Dakota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Nebraska. See
id. at 4. (For a wonderful map illustrating population proportions by county, see id. at 7.)
Many of the cases that McDonald discusses come from those jurisdictions where
Indians constitute a substantial (and sometimes a majority) share of the population. See,
e.g., McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 143-44 (discussing litigation in eighty-
three percent Indian Buffalo County, South Dakota); id. at 179-94 (discussing litigation in
Thurston County, Nebraska, where Winnebago and Omaha reservations "officially
comprise the entire land area" of the county).
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The first prong of the Gingles test seldom poses an obstacle; the fact that
most of the cases involve on-reservation Indians or Indians who continue to
live close to reservations means that the plaintiffs can easily establish that they
constitute a sufficiently large, geographically compact community. What is
dispiriting is how often those communities have been "cracked" among several
districts so that they form an ineffectual minority in each, "packed" into one or
only a few districts so that the remaining districts are easier for white voters to
control, or "stacked" into at-large systems when districted systems would yield
8 omajority-Indian constituencies.
Turning to the second and third prongs of the Gingles inquiry-which
operate as the flip sides of an inquiry into racially polarized voting - McDonald
paints pictures of highly polarized societies. He describes stunning levels of
bloc voting' easily comparable to figures from early cases in the Deep South.
8o. For a discussion of all three techniques, see Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme
Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 249-50 (1993).
For examples of the cracking of Indian communities, see Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp.
922, 927 (D. Ariz. 1972), which discusses an Arizona state legislative reapportionment in
which the Navajo Indian Reservation was divided among three legislative districts at the
insistence of an incumbent who might otherwise have lost his seat and concludes that
"[t]here is ample basis to suspect that 'the Indians were done in,"' id. (quoting Ely v. Klahr,
403 U.S. 108, 119 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)); McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra
note 3, at 104, which discusses how the 1992 Montana state legislature assigned the Rocky
Boy's and Fort Belknap reservations to different districts, in both of which Indians were
unable to elect a representative of their choice; and id. at 142, which discusses Cottier.
For examples of packing, see id. at 133, which discusses how the Cheyenne River Sioux
were packed into an overpopulated, ninety-percent Indian state legislative district, thereby
depriving them of the ability to form a majority in an adjacent district as well; id. at 143,
which discusses Buffalo County, South Dakota, where whites, although only seventeen
percent of the population, controlled two of three districts; and Glenn A. Phelps, Mr. Gerry
Goes to Arizona: Electoral Geography and Voting Rights in Navajo Country, is AM. INDIAN
CULTURE &REs. J. 63, 77-79 (1991), which discusses the packing of the Navajo in Arizona.
For examples of stacking-which involves the use of at-large elections to submerge
concentrations of minority voters who could form a majority if districts were used instead-
see McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 87-89, which discusses Big Horn
County, Montana.
The prevalence of cracking and packing in redistricting plans illustrates one of the
reasons that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is so important: it requires federal
preclearance before decennial redrawing of district lines goes into effect.
81. For example, the expert testimony in Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Mont. 1986), a challenge to at-large elections in a Montana county, established that in
general elections, about ninety percent of Indian voters preferred Indian candidates while
eighty-seven percent of non-Indian voters voted for non-Indian candidates. McDONALD,
AMEICAN INDIANs, supra note 3, at 87-88; see also id. at 131 (in legislative races in South
Dakota House District 28, eighty-one percent of Indians favored the Indian candidates while
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And when he turns to evidence regarding the Senate factors, the facts are
equally stark." Indians in all five jurisdictions endured a history of
discrimination both inside and outside the political process." They continue to
suffer from marked socioeconomic deprivations that make it more difficult for
them to participate effectively in the electoral process. 8 ' They are subject to
racial appeals in campaigns ' and to unresponsive governments afterwards.8
Virtually no Indians are elected from constituencies that are not majority
Indian.
The litigation that McDonald describes more closely resembles the initial
vote dilution suits in which black and Latino plaintiffs faced "exclusion, plain
and simple,"8 , than the contemporary cases involving black and Latino voters.
It was possible to publish (and for McDonald to contribute to) a study entitled
Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. 8 By
contrast, an account of the Voting Rights Act's impact in Indian country
during that period would have been a slim pamphlet with a far less triumphant
title. It was not until 1983, long after litigation had begun to transform the
ninety-three percent of white voters favored other candidates); id. at 191 (in Thurston
County, Nebraska, the average level of support for Indian candidates was eighty-six percent
among Indians, but only eleven percent among non-Indians).
82. See, e.g., id. at 88-89 (summarizing the district court's findings with respect to the Senate
Report factors in Windy Boy); id. at 92 (summarizing the district court's findings with
respect to the Senate Report factors in United States v. Blaine County, a section 2 challenge to
at-large elections for a county commission in Montana); id. at 168-69 (summarizing the
district court's findings with respect to the Senate Report factors in Cuthair v. Montezuma-
Cortez School District No. RE-i, a challenge to at-large school board elections in a Colorado
community).
83. See, e.g., id. at 58-71 (discussing the history of discrimination in Montana); id. at 123-24
(doing the same for South Dakota); id. at 158-68 (doing the same for Montezuma County,
Colorado); id. at 184-88 (doing the same for Thurston County, Nebraska); id. at 206-12,
216-25 (doing the same for Fremont County, Wyoming).
84. See, e.g., id. at 11o (discussing socioeconomic disparities in Montana); id. at 125 (doing the
same for South Dakota); id. at 189-9o (doing the same for Thurston County, Nebraska); id.
at 227-29 (doing the same for Fremont County, Wyoming).
85. See id. at 89 (reporting such findings by the district court in Windy Boy).
86. See, e.g., id. at 8o (discussing the failure to employ Indians in county government and the
exclusion of Indians from juries in Big Horn County, Montana); id. at 136-37 (describing
discriminatory law enforcement in Bennett County, South Dakota); id. at 188-89
(describing the lack of responsiveness to Indians' concerns in Thurston County, Nebraska).
87. Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right To Vote, 44 EMoRY L.J. 869, 88o (1995).
88. QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 47.
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Deep South and Hispanic Southwest, that the ACLU Voting Rights Project
brought its first vote dilution suit in Indian country. "
While Indians still struggle to elect candidates at all, the central issue for
African-American communities often involves consolidating and preserving the
gains achieved over four decades of vigorous litigation by the voting rights bar
and administrative enforcement by the Department of Justice.90 Contemporary
vote dilution cases often raise complex questions. Are black voters better off
under an electoral structure that allows them to elect a few representatives who
are accountable only to them, or is a plan in which they exercise influence, but
not outright control, over a larger number of representatives superior? Is there
a tradeoff between "descriptive representation" -black voters' ability to elect
black candidates-and "substantive representation" -their ability to obtain
public policies that they prefer? Should support from black elected officials for
a challenged plan influence judicial analysis under the Voting Rights Act?9 1
Has the minority community in some sense been too successful- that is, has
the system taken race into account too much in drawing minority districts?92
Indian communities have not yet had to face these hard questions because they
are still facing the antecedent ones about their ability to elect representatives at
all. They face a real risk during the upcoming redistricting following release of
8g. See McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing Windy Boy). The
ACLU's involvement was a happy accident. One of the two local tribal attorneys involved in
planning the lawsuit "was married to the director of the Montana ACLU affiliate, who was
aware of the ACLU's national projects and called the Voting Rights Project in Atlanta."
McCOOL ET AL., supra note 9, at 41. Last year, when a kitchen fire at a civil rights conference
forced McDonald and me out into a pasture to eat our lunches, he recalled his introduction
to Indian voting rights issues in Windy Boy and brought me up to date concerning the lead
plaintiff, Janine Windy Boy (now Janine Pease). He described with genuine delight how she
later received her doctorate in education, founded Little Big Horn College, and received a
MacArthur Foundation fellowship.
go. Michael Pitts refers to the current situation as one of "maintenance." Michael J. Pitts, The
Voting Rights Act and the Era ofMaintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903 (2008).
Latino communities are in a somewhat intermediate position. On the one hand, they
have achieved tremendous gains in representation since the early 1970s and, like the black
community, are seeking to preserve those gains. On the other hand, burgeoning Latino
populations, both in jurisdictions with longtime communities, such as Texas or California,
and in jurisdictions where Latino populations were previously small or nonexistent, are
creating new potential opportunities to draw districts from which they can elect candidates
of their choice.
gi. For discussion of these issues, see Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); and ISSACHAROFF
ET AL., supra note 45, at 778-89.
92. This is the so-called Shaw question, named after the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a comprehensive discussion of the Shaw cases, see
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 45, at 724-60.
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the 2010 census data. Not only may hostile jurisdictions try to take back
Indians' gains over the past decade-a battle in which section 5's preclearance
requirement provides some protection to Indians in Arizona and parts of South
Dakota, but not in Nebraska or Wyoming-but the Supreme Court also seems
poised to relax some of section 2's protections against vote dilution on the
grounds that they are no longer needed, failing to recognize that Indian voters
are a generation behind in their quest for effective political power.
Moreover, Indian voters face some complexities that black and Latino
voting rights plaintiffs have been spared. Just as non-Indians offered
distinctive arguments for disenfranchising Indians, they have tried to offer
distinctive defenses to vote dilution claims brought by Indian plaintiffs. For
example, Gros Ventre and Assiniboine voters living on the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Blaine County, Montana, brought a section 2 suit challenging
the use of at-large elections for the county commission. Although Indians
constituted roughly forty-five percent of the total population, and thirty-nine
percent of the voting-age population, no Indian had ever been elected to the
commission." The county advanced two unusual arguments against the
district court's finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied Gingles's requirement of
political cohesiveness." First, it argued that despite overwhelming evidence of
racial bloc voting -the county's own expert witness "conceded that American
Indians voted cohesively in one hundred percent of County Commissioner
elections and ninety-five percent of exogenous elections for county, state, and
national offices"s-the plaintiffs lacked any distinctive political concerns.96
Second, it argued that the relatively low turnout among the Indian community
undercut any finding of political cohesion.
93. See United States v. Blaine Cnty., 363 F. 3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2004).
94. The county also challenged the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act's use of disparate
impact standards. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 9, at 122-23 (referring to the county's
motion for summary judgment arguing that section 2 could not apply to Blaine County or
Montana because Congress had virtually no "evidence" -and the brief put that word in
quotation marks -of discrimination against Indians). The Ninth Circuit rejected that
challenge. See Blaine Cnty., 363 F. 3d at 900, 903-09.
95. Id. at 910.
96. See Brief for Appellants at 30-34, Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3 d 897 (No. 02-35691); see also McCOOL
ET AL., supra note 9, at 125 (describing the county's position before the district court that
"American Indians are not and cannot be politically cohesive for want of distinct political
interests that could be furthered by the Blaine County Board of Commissioners" in light of
the fact that "the Tribe provides all the services that might normally be provided by county
government").
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The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. It refused to "second guess
voters' understanding of their own best interests."" The county's suggestion
that the Indians' identified interests were "unfounded . . . essentially asks us to
deny the validity of American Indian voters' self-professed interests. Were we
to do so, we would be answering what is inherently a political question, best
left to the voters and their elected representatives."' Blaine County's
argument, then, was reminiscent of the discredited position taken by the
Arizona Supreme Court in Porter" that Indians were incapable of self-
government. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the county's arguments
regarding low turnout
would undermine section 2's effectiveness. After all, "[flow voter
registration and turnout have often been considered evidence of
minority voters' lack of ability to participate effectively in the political
process." Thus, if low voter turnout could defeat a section 2 claim,
excluded minority voters would find themselves in a vicious cycle: their
exclusion from the political process would increase apathy, which in
turn would undermine their ability to bring a legal challenge to the
discriminatory practices, which would perpetuate low voter turnout,
and so on."o
McDonald explores a related form of this argument, which he terms the
"reservation defense": low turnout among on-reservation Indians is a function
of their focus on tribal elections instead."o' To be sure, there has been debate
within the Indian community over whether on-reservation Indians should
participate in U.S. elections.o 2 But that debate should not eclipse the fact that
97. Blaine Cnty., 363 F-3d at 910.
98. Id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
oo. Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3d at 911 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gomez v.
City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1416 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988)).
lol. See McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 255 (describing South Dakota's reliance
on this argument in Emery v. Hunt, a challenge to the state's 1996 interim legislative
redistricting plan).
io2. Compare, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 71, at 359 (describing arguments that Indians "should be
full players in [state and local] elections"), and John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter,
1o KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533 (2000) (arguing that political participation is vital to
protecting Indians' interests), with Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws:
Native Traditions and the United States Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1565, 1577 (1998)
(claiming that while "[n] on-Indian Americans generally consider citizenship a blessing," the
Indian perspective "is radically different" and quoting a Mohawk woman stating that "my
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Indians do seek to participate in U.S. elections and that electoral structures that
deny them a realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice may
deter them from voting. McDonald comes down strongly in the camp of those
who believe that depressed levels of political participation among Indians are a
product of past discrimination, rather than present separatist sentiment.os
The reservation defense does, however, raise one intriguing question that
ranges beyond the scope of McDonald's book."o4 What about voting rights and
electoral structure on the reservation - that is, in tribal elections?
Ill.INDIAN ELECTIONS AND THE FIGHT OVER SELF-GOVERNMENT
Sophisticated tribal governments existed long before Europeans arrived in
North America. The Iroquois, for example, claim theirs is the world's "oldest
parents always taught us that once you vote, you stop being an Indian"), Michael D. Oeser,
Tribal Citizen Participation in State and National Politics: Welcome Wagon or Trojan Horse?,
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 793, 799-8oi (2010) (suggesting that "reservation citizens are
embracing the demise of tribal governments if they continue to participate in federal and
state elections without taking steps to avoid the sovereign conflict that results" and arguing
that while tribal participation in federal elections may be beneficial, tribal participation in
local elections is not), and Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of
the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 152-54 (1999) (arguing against recent
efforts to increase Indian participation in state and local elections).
For a general discussion of Indian participation in off-reservation politics, see Wilkins,
supra note 37. For a historical account of the argument and Indians' dual citizenship status,
see Christopher K. Riggs, Dual Citizenship and the Struggle for American Indian Voting
Rights in the Southwest in the 1940s (Apr. 19, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
103. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 3, at 255-58. In an earlier article, McDonald
contended that the reservation defense
overlooked the fact that the state, by historically denying Indians the right to vote,
had itself been responsible for denying Indians the opportunity to develop a
"loyalty" to state elections. As the court concluded in Bone Shirt, "the long history
of discrimination against Indians has wrongfully denied Indians an equal
opportunity to get involved in the political process."
Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act in Indian Country: South Dakota, a Case Study, 29
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 43, 66 (2004) (quoting Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976,
1022 (D.S.D. 2004)).
104. McDonald does describe, in relatively brief terms, some aspects of tribal self-government,
but he does so in the context of discussing federal policy and thus treats the internal
operation of tribal governments as essentially opaque. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS,
supra note 3, at 3-29.
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continuously functioning democratic constitution,""o' and there is a rich
scholarly literature on the intellectual contributions that Indian practices made
to the Founders' democratic theory.106
There remains a staggering diversity of governmental forms among
tribes.'0o But, to the extent that tribes embrace democratic principles, they, like
other polities, confront questions about who should participate and how votes
should be aggregated to determine electoral outcomes. While a comprehensive
analysis of these questions is obviously beyond the scope of this Review, the
ways in which tribal governments have addressed these questions illustrate
some important themes that dovetail with questions about Indian participation
in federal, state, and local elections.
The question of who should be entitled to vote in tribal elections has at
least two important dimensions: citizenship and residence. There is no ironclad
rule that the franchise must be limited to citizens or to residents: in U.S.
history, we have examples of voters who are not citizenso"' and voters who are
105. Donald A. Grinde Jr., Native Americans and the Founding of the United States, in NATIVE
AMERICANS 3, 4 (Donald A. Grinde Jr. ed., 2002).
1o6. See, e.g., BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE
IROQUOIS, AND THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 18 (1981); Donald A.
Grinde, Jr., Iroquois Political Theory and the Roots of American Democracy, in EXILED IN THE
LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 227 (Oren
Lyons et al. eds., 1992).
107. See NELL JESSUP NEWTON & ROBERT ANDERSON, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW § 4.06[1] (20o5 ed.) (stating that although most tribes now elect at least some tribal
officials, many continue also to use traditional consensus-based systems to make important
decisions); Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 844-
45 (2007) (noting that "Nations such as the Pueblos, the Hopi, the Onondaga and the
Meskwaki, for example, organize tribal government theologically" and "religion plays a
dominant role in the selection of leaders," including those who exercise political leadership);
Paul W. Shagen, Safeguarding the Integrity of Tribal Elections Through Campaign Finance
Regulation, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 103, 165-73 (2009) (listing a variety of
electoral forms for tribal governments); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional
Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1343, 1358 (1969) (discussing governmental
structures among various tribes).
108. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 177 (1875) (noting that "citizenship has not in all cases
been made a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the right of suffrage" and that in nine
states "persons of foreign birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States, may under certain circumstances vote"); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 45, at
55-56 (discussing contemporary noncitizen voting in the United States and elsewhere);
Andr6 Blais, Louis Massicotte & Antoine Yoshinaka, Deciding Who Has the Right To Vote: A
Comparative Analysis of Election Laws, 2o ELECTORAL STUD. 41, 52-54 (2001) (discussing the
surprisingly widespread enfranchisement of noncitizens).
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not residents'"o (although no examples, as far as I know, of someone who was
neither a citizen nor a resident being entitled to vote). Nor, of course, is there
any rule that all citizens must be permitted to vote."o Even leaving aside
controversial restrictions on the franchise - such as the disenfranchisement of
persons convicted of a crime'' or persons suffering from various cognitive
impairments"' -the disenfranchisement of children, for example, occasions no
real debate.
There is extensive literature on the controversial question of tribal
citizenship."' Rather than wading into it, I want to highlight the narrower
question whether nonresident, "off-reservation" citizens of a tribe should
participate in its elections." 4
iog. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973ff-1 to 19 73ff-6 (20o6), allows U.S. citizens who have moved overseas to continue
voting in federal elections by casting an absentee ballot in the jurisdiction where they were
last domiciled. See also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 45, at 57-65 (discussing residency as a
requirement for voting and giving examples of nonresident voting); Peter J. Spiro, Perfecting
Political Diaspora, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 211 (20o6) (stating that "[b]lanket franchise
ineligibility for nonresident citizens appears to be increasingly the minority practice").
11o. See Minor, 88 U.S. at 170-78 (holding that the right to vote is not a privilege or immunity of
citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
ill. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding offender disenfranchisement as
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause). For more extensive discussion of offender
disenfranchisement provisions, see Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (2004).
112. See Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals,
38 McGEORGE L. REv. 917 (2007) (discussing this issue); Charles P. Sabatino & Edward D.
Spurgeon, Facilitating Voting as People Age: Implications of Cognitive Impairment, 38
McGEORGE L. REv. 843 (2007).
113. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only: Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, in
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 107,
107 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) (noting that "Indian nations' constitutional reform efforts
encounter some of their most paralyzing conflicts over criteria for membership"); L. Scott
Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 721
(2001) (describing the range of criteria that federally recognized tribes use for determining
membership). The citizenship status of descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen -the black
slaves held by Cherokee members prior to Emancipation-is perhaps the most visible
current controversy. See Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, No. JAT 04-09, slip op.
at 8 (Okla. Trib. 20o6) (holding that Freedmen could be citizens); see also Vann v.
Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (permitting a suit by disenfranchised
Freedmen descendants to proceed against federal and tribal officials for recognizing the
results of a Cherokee election from which they were excluded); Bethany R. Berger, Red:
Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLAL. REv. 591, 652-53 (2009) (discussing the issue).
114. Federal law governs the right to vote in tribal elections involving ratification or amendment
of tribal constitutions. See 25 U.S.C. 5 476(a)(1) (20o6) (providing that "[a]ny Indian tribe
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This question has great practical and theoretical significance. Many tribes
are, to borrow Kim Barry's phrase, "emigration states""': a significant
proportion of their citizens-in many cases, a majority-lives outside their
territorial boundaries."' The potential participation of off-reservation citizens
in tribal self-government raises a number of issues."' On the one hand,
participation can solidify an individual's sense of identity and strengthen her
bonds to the tribe. Enfranchisement thus performs an important expressive
function."' On the other hand, on-reservation and off-reservation citizens may
have different policy preferences. For example, in tribes now receiving
substantial revenue from natural resource development or Indian gaming, on-
reservation members may want those funds to be spent on infrastructure and
economic development, while off-reservation members may prefer that
revenues be distributed directly to tribal members on a per capita basis."' At
the same time, arguments of on-reservation citizens to restrict the franchise to
residents because they have more of a stake run the risk of recapitulating some
of the historic justifications used to disenfranchise on-reservation Indians,
particularly to the extent that tribal elections determine more than
geographically based policies. And there is some irony in denying tribal citizens
the right to vote to the extent that a lack of opportunity in Indian country was
one factor impelling them to move off the reservation.
shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate
constitution and bylaws, and any amendments thereto, which shall become effective
when .. . ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe or tribes at a special
election authorized and called by the Secretary [of the Interior] under such rules and
regulations as the Secretary may prescribe"). In some cases, "[a]ny duly registered adult
member regardless of residence shall be entitled to vote on the adoption of a constitution
and bylaws" and nonresident members can vote absentee. 25 C.F.R. § 81.6(a) (2010)
(providing for such rules if a tribe "is acting to effect reorganization under a Federal Statute
for the first time"). In other cases only "adult duly registered member[s] physically residing
on the reservation shall be entitled to vote." Id. § 81.6(b)(i).
115. Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context,
81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 11, 12 (20o6).
116. See Goldberg, supra note 71, at 358 n.14 (stating that approximately two-thirds of all Indians
live outside Indian country, "though many of these individuals maintain ties to their
homelands").
i1. See Goldberg, supra note 113, at 1o8-lo (describing the tension in one tribe between
members who had remained on the reservation and those who had left to pursue economic
security).
118. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (discussing the expressive functions that law can
play).
119. See Goldberg, supra note 113, at ill.
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Tribes have sought to accommodate these tensions in innovative ways.
Some tribes simply restrict voting to members who reside on the reservation."o
But if tribes do choose to enfranchise off-reservation voters, they have, broadly
speaking, two possible ways to do so. "Assimilated representation" assigns
voters to their "last place of in-country residence" and thus simply incorporates
nonresident voters into a preexisting system of geographically based
representation."' By contrast, "discrete representation" creates separate
electoral constituencies for nonresidents."' To the extent that the United States
permits nonresident citizens to vote,' it uses an assimilated approach. But
nations as diverse as France, Colombia, and the Cape Verde Islands use discrete
systems where 6migr6 voters choose their own representatives.' One
advantage that discrete representation can have is the ability to calibrate the
level of political power to be accorded nonresidents.12 s
To see how these practices play out, consider the approach taken by the
Cherokee Nation. Under its 1992 Code, the Tribal Council-the Cherokee
Nation's legislative body-consisted of fifteen members elected from nine
"representative districts within the historical boundaries/jurisdiction of the
Cherokee Nation."126 Representation among the districts was based on the
12o. See Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 707 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that, under the Crow
Creek Sioux Constitution, voting rights are limited to "those residing on the Reservation at
the time of the election").
121. Spiro, supra note 109, at 226. If one were voting for a single-member office, nonresident
voting would be assimilated almost by definition.
The desire to avoid dealing with how to handle the allocation of nonresident voters to
territorial electoral districts may explain why some nations permit nonresident voters to cast
ballots in the presidential election but not in legislative elections. For a discussion of the
Mexican experience in this regard, see Robert Courtney Smith, Contradictions of Diasporic
Institutionalization in Mexican Politics: The 2oo6 Migrant Vote and Other Forms ofInclusion and
Control, 31 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 708 (2008).
122. See Spiro, supra note 109, at 226.
123. See supra note 109 (discussing UOCAVA).
124. See Rainer Baubdck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A
Normative Evaluation ofExternal Voting, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2393, 2432-33 (2007) (surveying
the range of practices); Spiro, supra note log, at 214-15 (same).
And beyond the question whether off-reservation members should be enfranchised lies
the question of how they should cast their ballots. A system that requires them to return to
tribal land to vote has corresponding advantages (requiring some level of commitment) and
disadvantages (making it harder to vote). The Navajo, for example, permit absentee voting,
see 11 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 121 (1995), but some tribes do not.
125. See Baubdck, supra note 124, at 2433 (stating that discrete representation "can be used to give
either greater or smaller weight to the expatriate vote").
126. CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANN. tit. 26, 5 4 (1993).
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total population of tribal members.12' Tribal members who lived within the
national boundaries were required to register "in the district of their
residence."' But tribal members who lived outside the Nation's boundaries
could "choose any district in which to register to vote."" 9 The Cherokee
subsequently amended their election code to provide instead for a seventeen-
member Council, with fifteen members elected as before and two members
elected at large to represent the forty percent of Cherokee citizens "who live
outside the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation." 3o The choice to adopt
discrete representation of off-reservation citizens avoids the risk that the voters
in a particular representative district could have their preferences swamped by
off-reservation voters, as could easily happen given the relatively large number
of nonresident citizens. And it also allows the tribe to give greater weight to the
ballots of on-reservation voters: with sixty percent of the population, they
control eighty-eight percent of the legislative seats.
Obviously, then, the Cherokee have relaxed one fundamental principle of
contemporary U.S. democracy: one person, one vote. In Wesberry v. Sanders,1 31
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that "as nearly as is
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's."" Thus, "[t]he fact that an individual lives here or there is not a
legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.""3
The question whether and how one person, one vote applies to tribal
elections offers a final insight into the distinctive constitutional status of
Indians. Tribal governments are not bound directly by the protections in the
Bill of Rights. 134 They are, however, bound by the provisions of the Indian




130. Cherokee Nation Tribal Government, CHEROKEE NATION, http://wwVW.cherokee.org/
Government/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); see also Goldberg, supra note 113, at 129
(noting that forty percent of Cherokee live off-reservation).
131. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
132. Id. at 7-8.
133. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
134. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2724 (2008); see
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896) (refusing to apply the Due Process Clause to
Cherokee proceedings); see also Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minn. Chippewa
Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1967) (refusing to find subject-matter jurisdiction over a
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tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.'"' Notably, the ICRA
deliberately omitted the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition on denying the
right to vote on account of race."36
Potential arguments for giving different weight to the votes of on-
reservation and off-reservation citizens are essentially extensions of the
arguments for disenfranchising nonresidents altogether.' The question of
whether a tribal election system can discriminate among on-reservation
citizens, though, is harder to answer.
In the years immediately following ICRA's passage, tribal elections were a
frequent source of litigation.' In White Eagle v. One Feather"'9 and Daly v.
United States,'4o the Eighth Circuit held that the requirement of one person,
one vote applied to tribal elections, at least when the tribe "has established
voting procedures precisely paralleling those commonly found in our culture, if
not taken verbatim therefrom."14' In Daly, however, the court offered an
intriguing qualification: while requiring that tribal apportionments be "based
on the population of the Tribe and not solely those eligible to vote,"'4 it
135. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006).
136. See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (loth Cir. 1971) (pointing out this omission).
There was, as far as I am aware, no real discussion of Fourteenth Amendment-based
constraints on tribal electoral processes.
i3. But cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) (declaring that although
"[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States," once a state chooses to select its electors by popular election,
"the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over
that of another"). Even here, however, the word "arbitrary" leaves open the possibility that
there might be nonarbitrary reasons for valuing votes differently.
138. Gary D. Kennedy, Tribal Elections: An Appraisal After the Indian Civil Rights Act, 3 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 497,497 (1975).
139. 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
140. 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973).
141. White Eagle, 478 F.2d at 1314. But see Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of the Oglala Sioux
Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 507 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1975) (refusing to require
that a tribe permit eighteen to twenty-one-year-olds to vote because, although "it is not a
significant interference with any important tribal values to require that a tribe treat equally
votes cast by members of the tribe already enfranchised by the tribe itself. . . employing the
ICRA to require a tribe to enfranchise a new class of the tribal population would present a
real question of whether, to some extent, this court was 'forcing an alien culture . . . on this
tribe"').
142. Daly, 483 F.2d at 706.
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"express[ed] no opinion" on how to deal with off-reservation members: "That
is a purely internal decision which must be made by the Tribe itself."1 43
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,'"
Indian apportionment challenges in federal court have essentially been
foreclosed; ICRA claims must instead be litigated in tribal fora. 14s But the
substantive question remains exactly how the ICRA's equal protection clause
should apply in tribal elections. Neither the language nor the legislative history
of the ICRA definitively answers the question whether the rationality (or the
compelling nature) of a tribe's reason for structuring its electoral arrangements
in a particular way "is to be tested by Indian or non-Indian cultural
standards.1I46 But because one of the purposes behind the ICRA was
"furthering Indian self-government,"147 it would be ironic if the Act were used
to foreclose tribes from selecting the electoral form that best accommodates
their distinctive interests. The Supreme Court has directed that terms in a
treaty between the federal government and an Indian tribe should be construed
"in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.'141
Perhaps the same principle should inform construction of the equal protection
clause of the ICRA. Under such a framework, a tribe might well be able to
show that its decision to deviate from pure population equality in apportioning
representatives serves sufficiently substantial reasons to survive judicial
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
One of the most famous passages ever written in a law review came from
the pen of Felix Cohen, the great scholar of Indian law: "Like the miner's
canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of
143. Id. at 707.
144. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
145. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that ICRA claims can be brought in federal court only
under the Act's habeas provision, see id. at 65, which is unavailable for voting rights claims.
But cf Riley, supra note 107, at 814-16 (noting that challenges to disenrollment from a tribe
or banishment of tribal members could be litigated under the ICRA's habeas provision).
146. Note, supra note 107, at 1360.
147. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
148. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676
(1979) (quoting Jones v. Mechan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
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other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith."14 ' Laughlin
McDonald's pathbreaking work-in the field litigating Indian voting rights
cases and in this book describing them-reminds us that Cohen was right as
well as poetic. The ongoing resistance to Indians' claims for full political
equality shows that the work of the Second Reconstruction remains
incomplete.
149. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE
L.J. 348, 390 (1953)-
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, economic forces of global magnitude have placed the
substance and value of education in the national spotlight. With jobs for
college graduates in short supply, political pundits and news commentators
have placed different estimates on the worth of a college degree and the
continued utility of the liberal arts.' Economists tie specific educational factors
to future income. A high school diploma, we are told, can translate into an
additional $300,000 in lifetime salary.2 A highly effective kindergarten teacher
likewise carries a value-added benefit of $320,000, the additional income that a
classroom of today's students may earn over the course of their collective
careers.3 This frenzy over outcomes has heightened public fears and influenced
attitudes and behavior. Educated parents rush to enroll their preschoolers in
Chinese immersion programs to enhance future career options. As the
documentary film Waiting for "Superman" dramatically portrays, poor and
working class parents agonize over lotteries that may or may not offer their
children admission to academically challenging charter schools, run by private
organizations with public funds.'
Current federal and state policy initiatives, along with local practices, both
mirror and energize this bottom-line mentality. States feverishly compete for
federal funds that used to be allocated according to student need, buying into a
strict regime of testing, standards, and accountability as they "race to the top."'
The federal Secretary of Education assures us that "[i]nvesting in this new kind
of education will sustain the country's economy" and will even prevent a
recurrence of the present economic crisis.' Local school officials use all of the
tools in their power to raise standardized test scores, the talisman of academic
success. Parents worry that their children will be left behind. Teachers worry
that their jobs are on the line.
1. See, e.g., Nancy Cook, The Death of Liberal Arts, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.con/blogs/jobbed/2oo/o4/oS/the-death-of-liberal-arts.html;
Ramesh Ponnuru, The Case Against College Education, TIME, Feb. 24, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,196758o,oo.html.
2. Gary Fields, The High School Dropout's Economic Ripple Effect, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2008,
at A13-
3. David Leonhardt, The Case for $320,ooo Kindergarten Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010,
at Ai.
4. WAITING FOR "SUPERMAN" (Electric Kinney Films 2010).
5. Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 59,813 (Nov. 18, 2009).
6. Arne Duncan, Through the Schoolhouse Gate: The Changing Role of Education in the 21st
Century, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POCY 293, 303 (2010).
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To be sure, no one would deny the connection between education and
economic success or the value of quality schooling. The fact that education is
critical to the individual and to the nation is irrefutable. Holding schools
accountable for student learning is unquestionable. Yet, listening to the
constant drumbeat of quantitative outcomes and productivity, one senses that
schooling has taken a definitive turn from the distant and not-so-distant past.
Lost in this narrative is a concern for developing responsible citizens (the goal
of early school reformers) and for providing equal opportunities based on
individual student differences (the goal of modern-day civil rights activists).
For common-school crusaders a century and a half ago, the purpose of
mass compulsory schooling was political. Facing the challenges of
nationalization, industrialization, and immigration in a relatively young
republic, they believed that education should impart the understandings and
principles necessary for democratic citizenship.' Though today's challenges
have shifted to globalization and post-industrialization, we are now witnessing
another wave of mass migration, while schools still play a crucial role in
preparing an even more religiously and racially diverse group of students for
democratic participation.
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Brown v. Board ofEducation" laid the foundation for broadening the mission of
schools; the Court's goals moved beyond political interests to include a child-
centered social view where equal educational opportunity, and the
government's obligation to provide it, became the national mantra. As the
federal government became increasingly involved in education policy, however,
a backlash began to mobilize. This was prompted in part by glaring
achievement gaps between white and racial-minority students, by opposition
to court-ordered busing to achieve racial integration, and by controversies over
bilingual classes and mainstreaming of children with disabilities.' Those
concerns, heightened by fears of growing competition from across the globe,
carried education to the present day when testing and accountability are the
rallying cries for reform. In today's education discourse, the political and social
purposes of schooling appear largely eclipsed by seemingly more pressing
7. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND COMMON
EDUCATION 14 (2000).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See PATRICIA ALBJERG GRAHAM, SCHOOLING AMERICA: HOW THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS MEET THE
NATION'S CHANGING NEEDS 158 (2005).
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economic interests aimed at creating human capital to compete in a global
economy.'o
Set against these ongoing developments, Martha Minow's new book, In
Brown's Wake," is a timely and sobering reminder that education is not simply
about the global marketplace. The book addresses Brown's impact on education
rights across a wide range of student differences and group identities and
touches on themes implicitly related to the purposes of schooling. In this
Review, I use the framework of Brown's legacy to examine more explicitly
those purposes. In doing so, I both widen Minow's lens and, at the same time,
narrow it. On the first count, I situate Brown more definitively in the broad
historical evolution of the common school. On the second, I look more
critically at the federal government's growing control and oversight of a system
initially designed to preserve state and local autonomy over schooling. I survey
historic moments, from mid-nineteenth-century interests in nation building, to
mid- to late-twentieth-century concerns with equalizing opportunities beyond
individual differences, to current economic and global pressures. I begin with
the common school's early history and then move on to Brown's dramatic
impact on the federal role in education, the apparent retreat from equal
educational opportunity, the current accountability and testing movement, and
the implications for American schooling.
Guided in part by initiatives announced subsequent to the publication of In
Brown's Wake, I maintain that today's productivity agenda falls short in
fulfilling Brown's dual promise: (1) to break down barriers that impede equal
opportunity (a well-developed theme of the book) and (2) to preserve
democratic government and the nation's political standing as a world leader (a
point that the literature has heretofore underaddressed). With a less sanguine
view than Minow's on equality's enduring force, I conclude that we risk
sacrificing one Brown legacy for another. While abandoning equal opportunity
as an overarching principle, we are moving toward a more assertive federal role
with a one-size-fits-all view of schooling that, in reality, undercuts post-Brown
guarantees to an appropriate and meaningful education and may, in the end,
more deeply divide students by race and social class.
1o. See David Tyack, School for Citizens: The Politics of Civic Education from 1790 to 1990, in
E PLURIBUS UNUM? 331, 362 (Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001).
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I. IN BROWN'S WAKE
For more than a half-century, scholars from a mix of disciplines have
dissected the Court's decision in Brown. What did equality mean as the Justices
saw it then? What has it come to mean over the years?" Martha Minow now
adds to that vast store of scholarship, providing a thoroughly researched and
panoramic view of the ways in which the decision has influenced education law
and policy across indices of race, national origin, wealth, disability, gender,
religion, and sexual orientation. A leading legal academic known for her
foundational work in feminist jurisprudence and current dean of the Harvard
Law School, she has spent the past three decades both as an advocate for
equality-based school reforms and as a scholar mining the depths of Brown's
equality mandate across the educational terrain."
The book explores a number of themes, including the tension between
separation and integration, the nuances of sameness and difference, the utility
and limits of social science evidence, the federal role in education, the equity
arguments supporting parental choice broadly conceived, and Brown's
influence on the law of foreign countries. Minow walks us through the pre-
and post-Brown landscape, introducing us to key political and legal actors and
the equally bold, but unsung, plaintiffs who transformed education in the
mold of equality. Along the way, we meet activists, like W.E.B. DuBois, who
strove tirelessly to upend Jim Crow laws in the South. We also encounter the
efforts of lawyers like Charles Hamilton Houston, former dean of Howard Law
School, who along with Justice Thurgood Marshall helped design and
implement the legal strategy that, case by case, culminated in the Brown
decision."
We come upon plaintiffs like Kinney Kinmon Lau-a young boy born in
Hong Kong whose lawsuit against the San Francisco school system
dramatically influenced federal law and education programming on behalf of
12. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(1976); GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1997); WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
13. See, e.g., JUST SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE (Martha Minow,
Richard A. Shweder & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 2008); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990).
14. MINOW, supra note II, at 13-16.
1459
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
English language learners." We also meet federal judges like J. Skelly Wright,
whose decision striking down ability-tracking in the District of Columbia
schools' 6 inspired subsequent litigation" and legislation'" and hastened the end
of the exclusion of children with disabilities from mainstream schooling." We
encounter distinguished scholars and dedicated advocates like Michael
McConnell who, building on the equality norm from prior case law,
tenaciously worked at laying the constitutional groundwork for extending
Brown's legacy to the expressive rights of religious students in public schools
and to the allocation of government funds to families whose children attend
religious schools.2 o
Dean Minow goes further into two areas typically overlooked in the
commentary on equality in general and Brown in particular. Her discussion on
the rights of American Indian and Native Hawai'ian students is especially
insightful. The checkered history of educational policies for both groups
underscores the tension between the dangers of sorting individuals into
separate schools by identity and the beneficial effects of group-based remedies
on group affirmation and mobilization. Equally enlightening is her discussion
of Brown's influence on equal educational opportunities for minorities in
countries like Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Czech Republic.
Whether invoked explicitly by judges or used by advocates as a persuasive
argument, the decision, with its core doctrine that separate education is
"inherently unequal," remains an inspirational bulwark against unjust
treatment of children around the globe. Her conclusion that Brown "now
belongs to the world" is ripe for further examination."
15. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); MINoW, supra note 11, at 37.
16. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17. See, e.g., Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
18. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-3 8 0, § 614 (d), 88 Stat. 484 (requiring
"procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children ... are educated with children who are not handicapped . . . "); Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(20o6)).
19. MINow, supra note ii, at 71.
20. MINOw, supra note ii, at 85-87; see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (2000). For examples of the Supreme Court's receptivity to such
arguments, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002); and Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001).
21. MINOW, supra note ii, at 187.
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What most strikingly sets this book apart from many others is the author's
objective eye. With each chapter, she impressively refrains from turning the
discussion into a liberal polemic or a disheartening diatribe on the failure of
Brown to dismantle segregated schooling or to create a racially integrated
society. Throughout the book, including her discussion on social science
evidence to support social integration," she evenhandedly presents the pros
and cons of each issue without betraying her progressive stripes or
compromising her commitment to equal opportunity for all students,
particularly the least advantaged. She realistically measures the progress made
while noting the tasks left undone and the obstacles that remain in the way.
Moreover, she does not summarily dismiss controversial concepts, like single-
sex schooling or school choice (including vouchers and charter schools) as
merely driven by political conservatives through equality's back door. To her
credit, she acknowledges the equality arguments supporting such initiatives
while recognizing problems in their implementation.
On single-sex schools and classes, she recognizes the limitations of social
science evidence in justifying the separation of students by sex given the
"politicized context" of the research and lack of a perfect control setting for
comparison." Examples of these defects include: (1) that many studies suffer
from selection bias, failing to account for parental involvement and
socioeconomic status; (2) that research findings typically come from other
countries, thus calling into question their applicability to the United States;
and (3) that researchers tend to have a bias for or against the concept being
tested.' Minow further raises concerns that single-sex programs can revive
outmoded gender stereotypes." Reported practices, like encouraging girls to
write about wedding dresses and boys about hunting, understandably invite
litigation. Despite these reservations, she concludes that such programs are
worthy of experimentation when offered as a voluntary alternative to
coeducation."
22. Id. at 146-62.
23. Id. at 155.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id. at 65.
26. See Emily Richmond, Single-Sex Classes Being Praised on Many Levels: Jury Still Out. But
Some Educators Already Convinced of Benefits, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 19, 2009, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jul/19/single-sex-classes-being-praised-many
-levels/; Elizabeth Weil, Teaching to the Testosterone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, 5 6
(Magazine), at 38.
27. MINOW, supra note II, at 66.
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On the matter of school choice, though a measured supporter, Minow
warns against the potential for families to use choice options to self-segregate
and for school officials to facilitate that result. She suggests that regulations
might temper those tendencies.2" And while she cautions that government
vouchers to attend religious schools can promote social segregation, she notes
that under some circumstances they also promote greater diversity, as in the
case of inner-city Catholic schools that enroll substantial numbers of non-
Catholic students, many of them racial minorities. 29 On the other hand, though
she recognizes that accommodating religious beliefs and activities in public
schools can prove divisive, she also understands that such accommodations
avoid the isolation of many religiously affiliated schools, inducing religious
observers into the mainstream.3o
In a similar vein, she evaluates ethnically themed schools which, critics
claim, "balkanize American identity."" She gives the example of the Twin
Cities International Elementary and Middle Schools in Minnesota, serving
mainly students from Somali immigrant families. If viewed as transitional
institutions, she says, such schools provide opportunities for parents to pass on
their traditions to their children and for their children to intermingle with
others while developing skills in two languages."
Minow skillfully navigates the muddy waters of sameness and difference in
her discussion of single-sex schooling and bilingual education. Here she
demonstrates how extending the sameness/difference dichotomy beyond race
has both challenged the original homogeneity of the common school and
strained the contours of equality. Though a central objective of the Court's
holding in Brown was to eradicate the notion that race signified any inherent
differences between people, gender continues to be viewed as a marker of real
and natural differences." While the origins of sex differences in aptitudes and
attitudes (whether biological or culturally conditioned) are highly debatable, 4
28. Id. at 135.
29. See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY
CONTROL 109-30 (1978) (arguing that school choice can promote racial integration); JOSEPH
P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL
SOCIETY (1999) (arguing that school choice promotes equal educational opportunity for
economically disadvantaged children).
30. MINOw, supra note 11, at go.
31. Id. at 46.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 33.
34. C(f ROSALIND BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SAME DIFFERENCE: How GENDER MYTHS ARE
HURTING OUR RELATIONSHIPS, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR JOBS (2004) (discounting such
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differences in language and culture for English language learners are
definitively social and incontestable. Minow demonstrates that it remains
controversial whether the "separate is inherently unequal" doctrine applies
with equal force to single-sex" and bilingual programs6 as it does to racial
segregation.
Minow's arguments on integration and separation are similarly nuanced,
though her repeated references to the "integration ideal" that flows from Brown
can be confusing, especially to the uninformed reader. Given the racial politics
of that day, particularly in the South, the Court reasonably did not impose a
legal mandate for affirmative racial mixing but rather viewed integration as an
aspirational vision for the future. Nonetheless, she rightly laments Brown's
failure to achieve racial integration in the schools." And though she expresses
some reservation over Richard Kahlenberg's argument for socioeconomic
integration" she recognizes that this may be the most viable option given the
Supreme Court's retreat from even voluntary race-based remedies. 9 She
further concedes that integration is not the only way to achieve equal
opportunity in the case of certain groups like students with disabilities. 4 o
I depart from Dean Minow-and this goes to the central thesis of this
Review-with regard to her optimistic belief in the equality ideal as a
predominant force driving current education policy. I suspect that some
education observers would question her recurring affirmations that equal
opportunity remains the "established," "undisputed"42 goal and "settled
differences); ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX
SCHOOLING 103 (2003) (recognizing that many observed differences- though not all-are
culturally conditioned, and suggesting that innate differences are enhanced by cultural
factors); LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED To
KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 29 (2005) (arguing for sex-based
biological differences on the basis of brain scans).
35. MINow, supra note ii, at 67; see, e.g., Jesse Ellison, The New Segregation Debate, NEWSWEEK,
June 22, 2010, www.newsweek.com/2oio/o6/22/the-new-segregation-debate.html.
36. MINOW, supra note 11, at 47.
37. Id. at 32.
38. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE (2001).
39. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(prohibiting the use of student racial identities in school assignments to achieve racial
balance absent a finding of official intent to discriminate); MINOW, supra note II, at 126, 152-
53.
40. MINOW, supra note ii, at 78.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id. at 147.
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touchstone" 4 of American schooling. Looking at the facts as she presents them,
one is likely to find a disconnect between the rhetoric of equality and the reality
of policy and practice. Continued achievement gaps between minority and
white students, differences in the quality of education afforded the middle class
and the poor, and parental enthusiasm for inner-city charter schools as an
escape from failing public schools all point in that direction. As Jack Balkin
noted a decade ago, "By the end of the century, the principle of Brown seems as
hallowed as ever, but its practical effect seems increasingly irrelevant to
contemporary public schooling."' Ten years later, as I will discuss, even the
rhetoric seems to be growing dimmer in the push toward testing,
accountability, and productivity.
The book could have more effectively teased out that reality had it directly
and more fully discussed how the gradual shift since the mid-1970s from equal
access to equal outcomes threatens to undermine the equity-based reforms that
lie at the core of Brown's legacy. It is true that Minow addresses market-driven
rationales for school choice." She also mentions the federal No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) several times in passing.4* She notes the problems with
high-stakes tests, especially for English language learners,4 7 and for students
with disabilities though she supports the use of tests as accountability
measures. 8 She briefly acknowledges that the Obama Administration "focuses
on school improvement, not racial integration,"4 9 without further elaboration
or judgment. Yet these points seem isolated and merely peripheral to her
overall discussion. Admittedly, this may be a tall order for a book of already
such ambitious scope. And, concededly, some of the most controversial federal
initiatives now debated in the press started emerging as the book went to press.
That being said, eight years of NCLB provide perspective and a rich store of
43. Id. at 31.
44. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID, supra note 12, at 8.
45. MINOW, supra note ii, at 117-18; see JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
46. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note i1, at 29 (noting mandated performance measures focusing on
student race); id. at 48 (discussing provisions on standardized tests); id. at 112-13 (noting
the constraints on the option of parents to obtain a waiver for their children to leave a failing
school for a higher-performing one); id. at 147 (discussing mixed results from state testing
programs).
47. Id. at 48.
48. Id. at 8o.
49. Id. at 31.
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information on the changing federal role in education, a role that Brown and its
aftermath both shaped and energized and that NCLB took to a higher level.
The book also underplays democratic citizenship and the mission of
schools to make "good citizens" as key components of Brown's ruling.so Minow
notes that "Brown underscored the importance of schooling as the key entry
point for jobs and civic participation," makes several references to citizenship
and civic engagement," and acknowledges the interests of early common-
school reformers in building a democracy." She makes no mention, however,
of democracy among the three "memorable ideas" that stand out in Brown. 4
Like many others, she hails the decision as "central" to the protection of
individual rights and recognizes the inherent tension with group rights to a
shared identity." But she fails to emphasize that the Court, perhaps in a nod to
patriotic fervor, also underscored "the importance of education to our
democratic society," calling it "the very foundation of good citizenship" and "a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.", 6 In doing so,
the Justices implicitly tied their ruling to the past and future, validating the
rationale underlying the common school while foreshadowing the equality-
based reforms that followed.
I now fill in what In Brown's Wake left unsaid, examining the early
common school, the expansion of the federal role following Brown, and the
accountability and testing movement. Each represents a critical moment in the
nation's history, and each opens a particular window on the legacy of Brown as
it relates to the mission of schooling in America.
II. THE COMMON SCHOOL AND PRESERVING DEMOCRACY
Education, as embodied in the common school, dates back to the early
Athenians, who believed in training males of certain birth to perpetuate the
so. See generally MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch &
Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001) (interrogating the normative place of politics and values in
civic education).
Si. MINOw, supra note 11, at 35.
52. See, e.g., id. at 139 (suggesting civic engagement and democracy as possible success measures
of social integration); id. at iso (presenting the integration ideal as a "crucial element of
preparing individuals for successful and productive lives as ... civic participants in a
pluralistic, democratic society").
53. Id. at 160.
54. Id. at 19.
s5. Id. at 104-05.
56. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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state's most cherished values. Their concept of paideia joined citizenship and
learning around a shared set of norms and values under the legal and moral
authority of the politeia, or prevailing culture." Though the state did not
establish or finance education, it rigidly supervised and regulated the
curriculum." In a modified fashion, modern nation-states have relied on mass
compulsory schooling to indoctrinate the young in a common core of
principles, the rationale being to promote solidarity through a shared sense of
identity.
In the United States, the link between education and the political needs of a
secular society did not emerge until the late eighteenth century. Up to that
time, especially in the colonies, local schools typically operated under the
direction of religious denominations, even though they were funded with tax
revenues. Among the nation's Founders, it was Thomas Jefferson who
institutionalized the ideas of the ancient Greeks, tying schooling to citizenship.
For Jefferson, education was a mechanism for producing citizens of virtue and
intelligence (albeit only white males) to meet the demands of republican
government. In addition to realizing democracy, it was a means for advancing
social reform. 9
Nineteenth-century architects of the American common school
universalized that view and opened it to women. They relied heavily on the
Swiss educator Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, who advocated teaching the masses
"to love God and country" and to improve their work performance, without
posing any threat to the ruling class. Yet unlike Pestalozzi, who emphasized
spontaneity and creativity in educating the whole child, early school reformers
focused on the interests of society and of the nation.6 o The tension between
these two competing visions, one centered on the individual student and the
other directed toward the collective good, would dominate education discourse
throughout the coming century and to the present day.
As Minow affirms, the common-school cause "attracted reformers seeking
social improvement.",6 , But again the motive was largely statist. For Horace
Mann, the first Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education and a
leading figure behind the movement, public schooling was necessary to
57. LORRAINE SMITH PANGLE & THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE LEARNING OF LIBERTY: THE
EDUCATIONAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 58 (1993).
58. 1 ELLWOOD CUBBERLEY, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION 26 (1909).
sq. See SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 12-13.
6o. FREDERICK M. BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 1830-1805, at 24 (1974);
CLARENCE J. KARIER, THE INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
EDUCATIONAL IDEAS 224 (2d ed. 1986).
61. MINOW, supra note i, at 115.
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preserve republican institutions and to create a political community "out of a
maze of conflicting cultural traditions.",6' The segregation of immigrants in
distinct communities, their lack of economic means, and their low literacy rates
threatened the vitality of the Republic. The school would teach the newcomers
the principles of American democracy and lead them to appreciate the
institutions of American society.6, It would be "common" in that it would be
"open to all and free of charge," and it would instill in students a "common
core of values" combining "religion, politics, and economics in [a] vision of a
redeemer nation."64 Mann and his fellow reformers saw those values as a
nonsectarian compromise grounded in what they considered widely accepted
religious truths that, in reality, clearly reflected those of white, middle-class,
Anglo-American, mainstream Protestantism.6 , In the interests of promoting
equality while improving the quality of schools, they encouraged uniformity -
in "standards of pedagogy, schoolbooks, and even schoolhouses" -that
sometimes proved "stultifying, rigid, and inhumane," especially in urban
school districts.66
As eager as the common-school crusaders were to promote their
nationalistic goals, they also understood that a state-imposed ideology would
meet political obstacles from an American culture that was deeply suspicious of
central government. And so they built a "two-tiered governance structure"
whereby the state would maintain general oversight while local governments
would be responsible for the operation and primary funding of the schools. 6 7
In this way, the transmission of political, economic, and social knowledge
would remain in the hands of each community. As David Tyack explains, the
common school movement initially was a "grassroots phenomenon" wherein
62. Lawrence A. Cremin, Horace Mann's Legacy, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE
MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 3, 8 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., 1957).
63. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 44-47
(1951); SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 14.
64. DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP IN
AMERICA, 1890-1980, at 2o (1982).
65. Jeffrey E. Mirel, "Between God and the Youth of Our City": Conflicts over Religion and Education
in Detroit, 1842-1949, 22 URB. EDUC. 203, 205-o6 (1987).
66. David Gamson, From Progressivism to Federalism: The Pursuit of Equal Educational
Opportunity, 1915-1965, in To EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF
SCHOOL REFORM 18o (Karl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. Lodewick eds., 2007).
67. SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 16.
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local citizens consciously embraced the concept and directly determined what
their children learned.68
Through the late 18oos, the public school curriculum gradually became
more secular as the school population became more heterogeneous with the
addition of newly arrived Catholics and Jews who challenged the pan-
Protestant compromise. Educators and policymakers realized that it was more
important to Americanize the newcomers than to Protestantize them. The
move toward secularization continued into the new century and through the
mid-19oos. What became known as progressive education, most identified
with the pragmatist John Dewey, blended the romantic emphasis on the needs
of the child embraced by Jean-Jacques Rousseauj and later Pestalozzi, with a
"democratic faith" in the common school inherited from Jefferson and Mann.70
For Dewey, the school was an organ of social mobility, as well as a mechanism
for promoting both community awareness and a sense of national identity by
nurturing good citizens. The religion of the public schools more definitively
became the religion of democracy. Yet to their credit, Dewey and his
progressive followers rejected the nativist tendencies of the day, incorporating
an appreciation for cultural differences into the notion of community.
At the same time, other voices within education took the concept of
individual difference down a darker path. Academic elites like Ellwood P.
Cubberley, the dean of the Stanford School of Education, urged urban
educators to forsake the "exceedingly democratic idea that all are equal, and
that our society is devoid of classes."7 With the aid of intelligence and other
ability tests, school officials classified children into categories with a prescribed
curriculum. Democracy meant that educational "opportunity" would be
selectively delivered; "accepting one's place" took precedence over "equality." 73
And though the United States could pride itself as one of the few developed
countries that spread education across all classes largely by local initiative, the
system was highly stratified. Some students, primarily the children of
immigrants and racial minorities, were found to lack the inherent capacity for
academic pursuits and were tracked into vocational and "life adjustment"
68. David Tyack, Preserving the Republic by Educating Republicans, in DIVERSITY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: CULTURAL CONFLICT AND COMMON GROUND IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63,
65 (Neil J. Smelser &Jeffrey C. Alexander eds., 1999).
69. see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR, ON EDUCATION 37 (William Boyd trans. & ed.,
Teachers College 1965) (1762).
70. See Martin S. Dworkin,John Dewey: A Centennial Review, in DEWEY ON EDUCATION 9 (1959).
71. SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 25.
72. ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 57 (1909).
73. Gamson, supra note 66, at 183.
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programs. That view persisted into the 1950s until Brown jolted prevailing
assumptions about innate abilities and equal educational opportunity.
Related in part to progressive thinking, patriotism reached an almost
feverish pitch in the aftermath of World War I, when a number of states
adopted laws mandating varied forms of nationalistic instruction, including
courses in U.S. history and citizenship, flag displays, recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, and patriotic school assemblies.7 4 The push toward aggressive
"Americanization" continued full-throttle during the period between the two
world wars as the United States closed its doors to most foreigners and turned
its sights inward.7 ' At the same time, the nation closed its eyes to the evils of
racial segregation and discrimination within its borders.
Global events surrounding World War II and the years that followed
eventually demanded a turnaround in policies on both immigration and race,
all of which veered the common school once again in a new direction. The
imperative need for the Supreme Court to speak definitively as it did in Brown
crystallized in the pressures of the Cold War and the international
embarrassment of racial segregation.76 The unequal status of blacks, globally
visible in the wartime military, had become grist for the Soviet propaganda
mill. The injustice itself seriously threatened the nation's moral standing as
leader of the free world. Similar concerns compelled political forces to
reconsider restrictive immigration policies.
As for progressivism, its more extreme innovations had become irrelevant
to the times by the late 195os. Though classrooms had become more energized,
permissiveness and anti-intellectualism had distorted Dewey's dream, a
development that Dewey himself lamented. 7 By all objective measures,
progressives seemed inexplicably blind to domestic and global changes that
demanded greater emphasis on history, foreign languages, and technology.
They also seemed insensitive to the racial and class ramifications of separating
students by "ability" into academic, general, and vocational tracks.'8 In the end,
the enduring effects of the movement on the curriculum remain open to
debate, though the connection between school and society, envisioned by
74. SALOMONE, supra note 7, at 24.
75. see ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, TRUE AMERICAN: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, AND THE EDUCATION
OF IMMIGRANT CHILDREN 30-41 (2010).
76. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (demonstrating the role played by the Cold War and foreign
affairs in U.S. civil rights reforms).
77. Dworkin, supra note 70, at lo.
78. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980, at 78-8o
(1983).
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Dewey, resonates in Brown and continues to pervade America's approach to
education.
I.BROWN, EQUALITY, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE
The Court's decision in Brown was indeed a significant event that indelibly
changed the power configuration of public education. As Minow
comprehensively describes, the Court set the groundwork for equality to guide
numerous public policy decisions, initially at the federal level and subsequently
across the states, for decades to come. Until the mid-twentieth century, the
federal government had moved cautiously on education matters, stimulating
rather than regulating local activity primarily through categorical grants for
discrete projects, often in response to a perceived national "crisis."" In fact, up
to that point, the U.S. Office of Education, established during the
Reconstruction Era, had done little more than compile "obscure statistical
reports."so
By the mid-196os, the political aims embraced by Mann and Dewey had
fallen into the shadows as the state's interest in schooling took a new turn and
reformers sought to wed the social with the economic. With equality of
opportunity as their policy objective, architects of President Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society programs justified their proposals on a theory of education as
"investment in human capital.",81 For them, human skills and knowledge were
resources in which the nation ought to invest for the general welfare. That
compelling economic argument soon folded into a broader vision, one
emphasizing individual rights, as Brown and its aftermath propelled public
schooling into the orbit of equal educational opportunity.
Education more definitively became a leveling agent to foster social justice
along with economic growth. The rationale was as follows: poverty was a root
cause of educational failure; the poor tended to live in specific geographic
areas; and additional government assistance would grant them equal access to
educational opportunity which, in turn, would make them productive
members of society. Ironically, Horace Mann, looking to garner support from
business interests a century earlier, had reluctantly made a similar economic
79. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL
POLICY IN THE POST-BRowN ERA 2 (1986).
go. Id.
81. See 111 CONG. REC. 5736 (1965) (statement of Rep. Carl Perkins) ("If we can reduce the costs
of crime, delinquency, unemployment, and welfare in the future by well-directed spending
on education now, certainly, on this count alone, we will have made a sound investment.");
see also Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1961).
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pitch, though his decision to do so was purely pragmatic and contrary to his
moral instincts.
In combating the effects of poverty and promoting equality, the Johnson
Administration developed a two-pronged attack of carrots and sticks, using the
power of the federal purse to induce compliance with the Administration's civil
rights agenda. Congress first had to adopt a series of prohibitions to assure that
racial minorities were afforded equal treatment. Those prohibitions initially
appeared in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its various provisions, particularly
Title VI outlawing race and national origin discrimination, and granted the
Executive Branch authority to enforce the law's provisions." The following
year Congress passed Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965 (ESEA). Title I provided federal funds for remedial instruction to meet
the educational needs of educationally disadvantaged children by channeling
monies to communities with high concentrations of families living below the
poverty level. School districts that did not conform would be found ineligible
for much-needed federal aid.
The Administration, however, understood that such a dramatic expansion
in the federal role would raise concerns among the states. Affirming public
statements made by the President himself, both Francis Keppel, then
Commissioner of Education, and Democratic Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, made clear
that "the Federal Government must participate -not to seek domination, but to
serve as a partner in a vital enterprise"8 whose "determination" and
"execution" would belong "to local and State educational authorities."
Despite these assurances, government intervention gradually became more
sweeping as the years wore on. Each additional dollar brought greater
programmatic specifications and more federal control. In the process, the
economic purposes of schooling became swallowed up in the spirit of equality.
Though Keppel had hailed a "revolution of American education," joining
quality and equality,7 the outputs of student performance in fact were used
82. HORACE MANN, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, reprinted in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL, supra
note 62, at 53.
83. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601-02, 78 Stat. 252, 252-53 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
84. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
85. 111 CONG. REC. 88o (1965) (statement of Francis Keppel, Comm'r of Ed.).
86. mll CONG. REC. 5734 (1965) (statement of Rep. Adam Clayton Powell).
87. FRANCIS KEPPEL, THE NECESSARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 17 (1966).
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merely as a tool for assessing federally funded programs. Equality of
opportunity, or equal access, was no longer a means to a more productive
society but an end in itself.
Meanwhile, the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and (in particular)
the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act of 1965 dismantling immigration quotas set
in motion a diverse flow of newcomers into the country. Together with the
"Chicano" movement among Mexican-Americans, these seemingly
disconnected events created a robust notion of group identity and interest
group politics. They consequently posed new questions concerning the
relationship between race and national origin that bore on equal educational
opportunity and the government's role in providing it.
As Minow demonstrates, within the rapidly changing political environment
of the 1970s, the Civil Rights Act served as a template for subsequent laws that
enabled federal regulators and the courts to enforce and extend Brown's
equality mandate beyond racial minorities and those faced with poverty to
include the physically and emotionally handicapped," linguistic minorities,"
and women.9 o In that context, the concept became legally tied to notions of
adequate, appropriate, and meaningful education. These measures were
challenging for courts to define and for school officials to implement. By the
mid-1970s, the social and economic strands of equality were colliding as the
Court's 1971 decision upholding intradistrict busing provoked rancorous
debate and elected officials feared the political fallout.91
As that debate escalated, the Supreme Court and Congress quietly crafted a
legal and political basis for the accountability movement that soon followed. In
several key decisions and acts, each institution measured the right to equal
access and the remedy for denial not by racial integration or equal resources
88. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (20o6) ("No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States, as defined in section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
89. See Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204, 88 Stat. 514, 515
(requiring states "to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede
equal participation by its students in its instructional programs").
go. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 5 901, 86 Stat. 236, 373 ("No
person .. . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.") (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (20o6)).
gi. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecldenburg Bd. of Educ., 4 02 U.S. 1 (1971).
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but by student academic performance or outcomes.92 In 1974 in Lau v.
Nichols, and again in 1977 in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II)," the Court tied
the remedy directly to compensatory programs designed to improve the quality
of education and the academic gains of the plaintiff children. In the first, the
Justices affirmed the right of Chinese-speaking students in San Francisco to a
"meaningful" education that took into consideration their language
differences.s In the second, the Court broadened desegregation remedies and
goals beyond busing to achieve racial balance; upheld the use of remedial
reading programs, guidance and counseling services; and revised testing
measures to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination. 6
The link between instructional quality and student achievement, in fact,
was central to the plaintiffs' arguments in Lau, a case decided not under the
Equal Protection Clause but under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9'
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA),98 adopted just
subsequent to the Lau decision, similarly focused on instruction and its effects
on academic achievement. Feeling the sting of public opposition to court-
ordered busing, in 1972 President Nixon had proposed that the Act's emphasis
on the quality of education programs would accomplish civil rights goals far
more effectively." Essentially intended as anti-busing legislation, the Act also
prohibited the states from denying "equal educational opportunity" based on
national origin and required states "to take appropriate action to overcome
language barriers.""oo In 1974 when the EEOA was finally passed, Congress
92. Adam R. Nelson, Rodriguez, Keyes, Lau, and Milliken Revisited: The Supreme Court and the
Meaning of "Equal Educational Opportunity," 1973-1974, in To EDUCATE A NATION, supra note
66, at 202-24.
93. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
94. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
95. 414 U.S. at 566.
96. 4 33 U.S. 267.
97. For a discussion of the Lau litigation, see SALOMONE, supra note 74, at 119-36; Rachel F.
Moran, The Story of Lau v. Nichols: Breaking the Silence in Chinatown, in EDUCATION LAW
STORIES I1 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
98. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 5 204, 88 Stat. 514.
99. Address to the Nation on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing, 8 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 590 (Mar. 16, 1972), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php ?pid=3775&st=Busing&stl.
oo. Equal Educational Opportunities Act § 20 4 (f).
1473
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
further amended the Bilingual Education Act, 0' significantly increasing
targeted funds to local school districts to promote this same goal.'0o
As these events unfolded in Washington, a confluence of forces -including
an economic downturn with spiraling inflation- increased unemployment,
decreased tax revenues, and forced spending cuts at the local and state levels."o3
The public began to question federal expenditures for compensatory programs
and underfunded mandates, demanding greater accountability for educational
outcomes from the public schools. That backlash fueled a state-level testing
and standards movement that set the groundwork for stepped-up federal
initiatives. As the 1970s drew to a close, and as the achievement gap between
white and racial minority students continued to grow, there emerged a
groundswell of opposition ostensibly to the equality principle but in fact to the
specific reforms that were shaping Brown's legacy.
IV.ACCOUNTABILITY, TESTING, AND THE PRODUCTIVITY AGENDA
By the early 198os, many states had adopted minimum competency tests as
requirements for high school graduation. Proponents saw them as a means to
assess and thereby to improve student learning. A federal appeals court
decision lent constitutional legitimacy to that argument.' 4 Critics, on the other
hand, assailed the use of such high-stakes tests for the severe consequences that
they imposed, especially on disadvantaged and minority students."0 s
In 1983, a flood of disquieting reports inundating American educators and
the public further supported the reliance on test scores.1o 6 The most publicized
101. Elementary & Secondary Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 833,
88 Stat. 603.
102. Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual Education,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1271-72 (1988).
103. Nelson, supra note 92, at 203.
104. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981), reh' en banc denied, 654
F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981) (remanding for further proceedings because the record was
insufficient with regards to content validity, but indicating that tests would be
constitutional if covered materials were strictly from the curriculum).
105. See generally GEORGE MADAUS, MICHAEL RUSSELL & JENNIFER HIGGINS, THE PARADOXES OF
HIGH STAKES TESTING: How THEY AFFECT STUDENTS, THEIR PARENTS, TEACHERS,
PRINCIPALS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETY (2009) (providing a history of educational testing in the
United States and highlighting the dangers of using a single quantitative measure for all
students and schools as the key instrument for reform).
106. The year 1983 appeared to be the "year of the report." The major studies published
included: ERNEST L. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL: A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUCATION IN
AMERICA (1983); EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES TASK FORCE ON EDUC. FOR ECON. GROWTH,
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and influential among them, A Nation at Risk,"o' rallied and energized the
outcomes movement. President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Education Terrel
Bell had commissioned the report after the White House refused to sponsor it.
Subtly invoking national security fears, the report warned of a "rising tide of
mediocrity" imperiling American education.'o The nation had expected too
little of its schools over the previous two decades, having "squandered the
gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge" and
committing "an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament.""o'
The report's central thesis was that the performance of U.S. students was
on a downward spiral and thereby threatened the nation's technological,
military, and economic performance. The report cited test scores measuring a
variety of aptitudes and subjects to demonstrate that the schools were failing. It
then proposed standardized testing as a method to improve educational quality
and thereby maintain the nation's position among its competitors. Though
more overtly alarmist, the hauntingly familiar drift of the report both reflected
the 196os "War on Poverty" and foreshadowed the current "Race to the Top."
The compelling rhetoric of competition immediately caught the national
imagination while equal educational opportunity swiftly fell from public
attention. The first result is readily understandable. The second is somewhat
more complicated. Patricia Albjerg Graham explains the shift as follows:
The goal of the policy, equal educational opportunity, was admirable.
Making it happen was very difficult. . . . Efforts, undoubtedly
inadequate, to provide equal opportunity failed to provide equal results.
. . . Americans woke up to the fact that many of their children,
particularly ones of color, had not mastered academic subjects. . . . For
many Americans who did not want to be called racist, it seemed easier
to fight for greater academic achievement, a goal that few would
ACTION FOR EXCELLENCE (1983); JOHN J. GOODLAD, A PLACE CALLED SCHOOL: PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE (1983); NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATION REFORM (April 1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK], available
at http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html; and TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON FED. ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. POLICY, MAKING THE GRADE (1983).
107. A NATION AT RiSK, supra note 1o6; see also A Nation at Risk: A 2o-Year Reappraisal,
79 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 1 (2004) (providing a retrospective examination of the report and
addressing whether the state of public schooling in the early 198os was actually placing the
nation at risk, which of the recommended policies were adopted and whether they led to
educational improvement, and what risks and opportunities faced the nation twenty years
later).
lo8. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 1o6, at 5.
iog. Id.
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dispute, than to deal with disparities in opportunity between blacks and
whites, rich and poor directly.'
Apart from its historical and social significance, one would have expected
A Nation at Risk's troubling news to propel Washington into action. But those
were the Reagan years and the President had ridden into the White House on
the horse of "New Federalism." Arguing for the interests of state and local
control and individual freedom, the Administration advanced an attack on
numerous fronts -"budget reductions, deregulation, program consolidation,"
and cutbacks in civil rights enforcement among them.' In the end, though
these measures reduced the size of the federal share of education funding from
nine percent to 6.5 percent over eight years, they barely "touched its
contours."H..2 Other key proposals for granting tuition tax credits and
dismantling the newly created Department of Education, together with efforts
to erode equity-based programs for special student populations, remained
stymied in Congress.
A Nation at Risk merely alluded to the achievement gap between white
middle-class and low-income and minority students, with only a brief note on
"equit[y]" and the dangers of "undemocratic elitism."" 3 Yet despite the
apparent oversight, the report's emphasis on test scores as a measure of the
nation's productivity inevitably led to a more intense examination of those
glaring student disparities. In 1984, the Department of Education began
ranking the states according to scores attained by college-bound students on
the ACT and SAT." 4 Within a year, thirty-five states had adopted new
graduation requirements, twenty-two had enacted curriculum reforms, and
twenty-nine had set new policies on testing."s As Michael Heise points out,
state efforts to develop and implement standards and testing in turn gave
political legitimacy to federal policies moving in the same direction." 6 In 1988,
the ESEA reauthorization for the first time explicitly presented states as
partners in federal reform efforts. It also was the first time that the law focused
on educational outputs and not merely on inputs, tying academic performance
110. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 159-60.
Ill. SALOMONE, supra note 79, at 190-91.
112. PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL EDUCATION AGENDA 69 (2o6).
113. A NATION AT RISK, supra note lo6, at 13.
114. MARIs A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO No CHILD LEFT BEHIND: NATIONAL
EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 18 (2009).
u. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE NATION RESPONDS: RECENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EDUCATION
144-46 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1984).
ii6. Michael Heise, The Political Economy ofEducation Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 133 (20o6).
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of Title I students to state-defined achievement levels as a means of identifying
poorly performing schools."'
Beyond the Reagan years of federal retreat, and through successive
presidential administrations, A Nation at Risk continued to inspire a push for
national standards and increased federalization of education policy. The reform
movement began to take clearer shape under President George H.W. Bush
with the introduction of "America 2000," a set of goals for U.S. schools to meet
by the new millenium. Under the plan, the states would lead, and the federal
government would provide support. Though the legislation failed to pass
Congress, it served as the blueprint for President Bill Clinton's "Goals 2000"
program. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton considered themselves "education
presidents."""
Goals 2000 was a grant program meant to help states develop and
implement standards for all students, not just for those participating in Title I
programs. Congress adopted the initiative in 1994 to support the ESEA
reauthorization known as the Improving America's Schools Act. Together they
more definitively transformed Title I and hence the federal role. To be eligible
for funds under the Act, states had to create "challenging" content and
performance standards in reading and math for all students, develop
coordinated assessments, and establish plans for sanctioning failing schools."'
Achievement standards for Title I and non-Title I students for the first time
had to be the same. The Administration's increased demands on state and local
education agencies in exchange for federal dollars presaged even larger
exactions in the decade to follow. But President Clinton's plan to launch
national standards never materialized.
Federal involvement in education, depending on how one looks at it, both
increased and decreased under President George W. Bush. Paying lip service to
civil rights protections while cutting back on enforcement, his administration
dove deeply into state and local discretion over education programming. As the
Great Society architects had overstated the importance of inputs to promote
equal access, the Bush White House erred in the opposite direction. Achieving
equal results took center stage while Brown's equality mandate receded into the
background. The centerpiece of that effort, the NCLB of 2001,2 was the basis
117. 1MANNA, supra note 112, at 73.
1s. VINOVSKIS, supra note 114, at 35, 61.
119. Improving America's Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(A), (C) (2006); see JOHN F.
JENNINGS, WHY NATIONAL STANDARDS AND TESTS? POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR BETTER
SCHOOLS 154-70 (1998).
120. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (expired September 30, 2007, but automatically
extended until a new bill is enacted).
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for a sweeping overhaul of federal education programs and priorities with
testing and accountability as its driving force.
Using a similar but more comprehensive approach than the Improving
America's Schools Act, the most significant changes in NCLB related to
teachers, testing, and accountability. 1 21 Adopted with broad bipartisan support
and the endorsement of liberal Democrats including its cosponsor Senator
Edward Kennedy, NCLB presented far-reaching changes in the ESEA.12 2 Yet,
like the original ESEA, it used a carrot-and-stick approach to induce states and
school districts into complying with federal requirements. Though NCLB
expired in 2008, Congress has yet to reauthorize or replace it.
NCLB shifts the terminology from offering "equal educational
opportunity" and "equal access" to closing the "achievement gap," a term now
generally favored in education circles. The centerpiece of NCLB is a detailed
system of student testing and school accountability. It requires each state to
develop its own set of standards, which by the 2004-05 school year had to be
linked to a state-developed program of annual assessments in reading and
math for third to eighth grade students. The ultimate goal is for every student
to perform at a proficient level by the year 2014. In the interim, each state has
to submit to the U.S. Department of Education a report mapping out the
annual yearly progress that schools are expected to make. If a school fails to
meet that mark for more than two consecutive years, corrective action, which
might lead to staff dismissals and school closings, must be taken. Failing
schools must offer students free after-school tutoring and the opportunity to
transfer to another school.
States applying for federal funds must agree to participate in the reading
and math segments of the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP). The NAEP, referred to as "The Nation's Report Card," is a federal
testing program begun in 1969 that periodically assesses a representative
sampling of students in grades four, eight, and twelve in several core academic
subjects. It also tests a sample of students at ages nine, thirteen, and seventeen
for long-term trends and aggregates scores by race, sex, and locale."'
Comparisons between NAEP and state standardized test scores serve to
measure the quality of the standards that states have adopted on their own.
121. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932,
939 (2004).
122. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
123. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, NAEP Overview
(Aug. 16, 2010), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/.
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NAEP scores have been used to support successive waves of education reform
since the 1970s.
The Obama Administration's Blueprint for Reform, released in March 2010,
revisits a number of NCLB provisions." It eliminates NCLB's school ratings
based on the "annual yearly progress" on student test scores."' It also replaces
the 2014 proficiency deadline with the goal for all students to leave high school
"college and career ready" by 2020."' It thus attempts to avoid some of the
weaknesses of NCLB. Yet its tone and substance are still long on testing and
accountability and short on measures that directly support equal access. It calls
on states to develop new academic standards along with statewide assessments
that move students toward that goal. To that end, the National Governors
Association has coordinated an effort among the states to develop the Common
Core Standards, which, as of February 2011, had been adopted by forty-two
states and territories and the District of Columbia.'2 7 The Blueprint assures that
the federal government will continue to meet the needs of diverse learners,
including English language learners and students with disabilities, though it
offers no details. It also pledges support for additional public-school-choice
options.
The plan reaffirms the Administration's Race to the Top initiative,
announced in 2009."' Designed as a grant program, the initiative placed states
in competition, based on meeting certain criteria, for $4.35 billion in education
stimulus funds allocated for fiscal year 2010. Applicants had to create data-
driven systems for training and evaluating teachers and principals, encourage
the establishment of high-quality charter schools, develop plans for turning
around failing schools, demonstrate statewide political consensus for proposed
reforms, and adopt the national education standards.
V. THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF REFORM
Both the No Child Left Behind Act and the more recent Obama
Administration proposals raise a number of contentious issues that bear
124. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/
policy/elsec/eg/blueprint/ blueprint.pdf.
125. Id. at 9-1o.
126. Id. at 4.
127. COMMON CORE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/in-the-states (last
visited Dec. 28, 2010).
128. Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009).
1479
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
directly on Brown's legacy and the equality ideal. The most widely debated of
these involves testing. Since 2002, all fifty states have implemented
standardized testing schemes that measure student academic achievement in
English reading (or language arts) and math. Twenty-six states use statewide
tests as a graduation requirement or plan to do so in the near future. 1 2 ' The
testing question provokes sharp disagreements, even among those who
advocate on behalf of minority students. Some have employed tests as a sword,
others as a shield. Some maintain that test results hold school officials' feet to
the fire to move students successfully toward meeting state standards. But even
here they argue that current testing fails to consider differences among
students. 3o Many educators contend that the law "sets impossible goals for
students and schools and humiliates students and educators when they fall
short." 3'
As Diane Ravitch recently explained, "The problem with using tests to
make important decisions in people's lives is that standardized tests are not
precise instruments."' 2 Even testing experts, she tells us, advise school officials
that test scores should not be used "in isolation" but as part of a broader
assessment of student performance including school grades, class participation,
homework, and teacher assessments.' A striking irony of the accountability
and testing movement is that sanctions for failure, the very means used to
improve student achievement, have actually lowered the goals. As James Ryan
and others have noted, NCLB left states to decide how difficult their tests
would be, thus creating a perverse incentive for states to dilute their academic
standards and proficiency thresholds, transforming a "race to the top" to a
129. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: TRENDS IN TEST PROGRAMS,
ALTERNATE PATHWAYS, AND PASS RATES I (2010), http://www.cepdc.org/index.cfm
? fuseaction= document ext.showDocumentBylD&nodelD= 1&DocumentlD= 297-
130. See Impact of No Child Left Behind on English Language Learners: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Early Childhood, Elementary and Secondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th
Cong. 28-33 (2007) (statement of Peter Zamora, Co-Chair, Hispanic Education Coalition);
WORKING GRP. ON ELL POLICY, IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ENGLISH
LANGUAGE LEARNERS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6-7 (Mar. 25, 2010), http://ellpolicy.org/wp-content/
uploads/ESEAFinal.pdf.
131. Sam Dillon, Obama To Seek Sweeping Change in "No Child" Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010,
at Ai.
132. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: How
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"race to the bottom."14 Rather than focusing on the quality of the educational
experience for all students, states have "dumbed down" the test. The dramatic
drop in New York City's recalibrated scores on state-mandated tests, in the
wake of tougher state standards, brought this reality to light."' The results
should have come as no surprise to state and city officials. The tests were short
and predictable and released publicly, thus making coaching each year easier."
For critics of NCLB, like linguist Jim Cummins, federal and state policies
impose a "pedagogical divide" in which "poor kids get behaviorism and rich
kids social constructionism"-in other words, "skills for the poor and
knowledge for the rich." To underscore the absurdity of the situation,
Cummins recounts the experience of a Maryland English-as-a-Second-
Language (ESL) teacher who calculated that in the 2004-05 school year,
English language learners in a fifth-grade class had missed thirty-three days of
ESL classes, or about 18 percent of their English instruction, due to
standardized testing.
Cummins and others agree that relegating lower-achieving students, many
of them racial minorities, to a steady diet of English and math via "teaching to
the test" denies them the comprehensive and enriching education -including
the arts, social studies, science, literature, creative writing, civics, and foreign
languages - that students from wealthier communities and private schools
enjoy."' These subjects are often seen as the hook that gets students low in
math and reading skills to "care about school" and to appreciate the point of
reading beyond identifying "the main idea."',, A constant focus on test
preparation also denies students the critical thinking and higher-order analytic
skills essential for college and the workplace. Deep learning entails more than
practicing strategies and memorizing facts. Not only are standardized tests
inadequate for assessing important intellectual proficiencies, but evidence also
suggests that high scores may actually correlate with a superficial approach to
134. JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 10-11 (2010); see also Heise,
supra note 116, at 144.
135. Jennifer Medina, New Standards Mean More F's in State Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at
Ai.
136. Jennifer Medina, State Long Ignored Red Flags on Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2o0o, at Al.
137. Meteor Blades, Jim Cummins Demolishes NCLB's Ideology and Practice, DAILY Kos (July 26,
2007, 11:49:56 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2oo7/7/26/131722/394 (quoting Jim
Cummins's remarks in a speech before the annual conference of the California Teachers of
English to Speakers of Other Languages Association in San Diego on July 25, 2007).
138. LINDA PERLSTEIN, TESTED: ONE AMERICAN SCHOOL STRUGGLES To MAKE THE GRADE 123
(2007).
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learning."' The situation brings to mind the oft-quoted statement typically
attributed to Albert Einstein: "Not everything that counts can be counted, and
not everything that can be counted counts." 4 o
Recent data on the ACT test for college admissions (which covers English,
reading, math, and science) give credence to the curriculum gap. While the
numbers of black and Hispanic students taking the test have grown by 55% and
84% respectively over the past five years, both groups are far less likely than
their white or Asian counterparts to have taken a minimum core curriculum
that prepares them for college admissions. It is thus not surprising that in 2010,
only 4% of blacks and ii% of Hispanics reached ACT score levels that are
predictive of college success, as compared to 30% of white students and 39% of
Asians.41
The Obama Administration's reform proposals, in particular, contain a
number of conditions for the receipt of competitive funds that have provoked
vigorous debate. Supporters credit the approach with fueling innovation.
Critics, on the other hand, question the wisdom of expending fiscal and
political capital on programs like charter schools,'14 2 "turnaround" models,143
139. See ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING: RAISING THE SCOREs, RUINING
THE SCHOOLS 10 (2000).
140. See THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 293 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2005) (suggesting that the
quotation probably did not originate with Einstein); WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, INFORMAL
SOCIOLOGY 13 (1967) (representing the possible origin of the quotation).
141. ACT, THE CONDITION OF COLLEGE & CAREER READINESS 3, 15 (2010), available at
http://www.act.org/research/policymakers/cccrio/pdf/ConditionofCollegeandCareer
Readiness201O.pdf.
142. See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER PERFORMANCE
IN 16 STATES 3 (2009) available at http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/multiple-choice
credo.pdf (finding that charter school students performed the same or worse on math tests
than did students in traditional schools); CAROLINE M. HoxBy, SONALI MURARKA & JENNY
KANG, THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOLS EVALUATION PROJECT: How NEW YORK
CITY's CHARTER SCHOOLS AFFECT ACHIEVEMENT IV-4 (2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/-schools/charterschoolseval/how NYC charter schools affect
achievement-sept2009.pdf (finding that charter schools closed the achievement gaps
between inner-city students and their suburban counterparts).
143. See Andy Smarick, The Turnaround Fallacy, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 201o, at 21-26, available at
http://educationnext.org/the-turnaround-fallacy/ (reporting on studies finding that
attempts to save failing urban schools by restructuring and other methods tend to prove
unsuccessful and suggesting that they be closed); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Turnaround
Schools That Work: Moving Beyond Separate But Equal, CENTURY FOUND., available at
http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev264/turnaround.pdf (rejecting the conventional turnaround
model of changing faculty and school governance in favor of conversion to a magnet school
that attracts students of diverse socioeconomic class).
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and tying teacher evaluations to student test scores,1'4 that have yielded no
consistent evidence of success on student test performance. As Diane Ravitch
told the members of the National Education Association, "Equal educational
opportunity is the American way. The race will have few winners and a lot of
losers. That's what a race means." Tying teacher assessment, or even worse
compensation, to test scores, she warned, "will promote teaching to not very
good tests. It may or may not improve scores, but it definitely will not improve
education." She reminded the group that "[p]ublic schools are a cornerstone of
our democratic society."114
Democracy neither forms part of the current standards-and-testing
vernacular nor plays into the movement's objectives. In the Race to the Top
initiative, the juxtaposition of a winners/losers paradigm (it is, after all, a
"race") with the democratic mission of schooling is revealing. It specifically
uses terminology like "points," "winner announcements," and "finalists" in a
competition for funds based not on student need but on narrowly defined state
abilities. It measures those abilities by the state's adherence to certain rules
without considering differences among students. As a result, it treats students
merely as means for collecting data in the interests of national productivity
rather than as potential democratic actors.146
The composition of the second round of "winners" announced in August
2010 was especially eye-opening. Of the dozen states that received major
grants, eleven were east of the Mississippi. The sole exception was Hawaii. It
was clear that the rules favored densely populated Eastern states, placing the
144. See EcoN. POLICY INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER: PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF STUDENT TEST
SCORES To EVALUATE TEACHERS (2010) (report prepared by leading education scholars
questioning the validity of student test scores in determining teacher performance); NAT'L
CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, TEACHER PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE FROM THE PROJECT ON INCENTIVES IN TEACHING (2010) (reporting on three-year
randomized study in Nashville, Tennessee public schools and finding that performance-
based teacher compensation neither affected student achievement in math nor damaged
school culture); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION AND REGIONAL ASSISTANCE, ERROR
RATES IN MEASURING TEACHER AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE ON STUDENT TEST SCORE GAINS
(2010), available at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/2o1o4oo4/ (finding notable chance of
teachers being misjudged by ranking systems based on only several years of student test
scores); Stephen Sawchuk, Merit-Pay Model Pushed by Duncan Shows No Achievement Edge,
EDuc. WK., June 9, 2010, at 1 (reporting on findings from Chicago showing no evidence
that performance-based compensation for teachers boosted student achievement on math
and reading tests).
145. Diane Ravitch, Educational Historian, Speech Delivered at the 2010 Representative
Assembly (June 6, 2010), http://www.nea.org/grants/4o246.htm.
146. Kathleen M. Collins & Joseph Valente, [Dis]abling the Race to the Top, TCHR. C. REC., June
17, 20o, http://www.tcrecord.org/.
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nation's rural communities and sparsely populated Western regions at a
competitive disadvantage. Small towns with just one school could not establish
a charter school or attract new principals to failing schools. Rural states like
Vermont, New Hampshire, Idaho, and Montana had neither the staff nor the
resources to hire high-powered consulting groups like McKinsey to prepare
proposals of 500-plus pages, as some of the winning states had done. 147 The
results demonstrated how the Administration's overall shift from formula to
competitive funding for such a large allocation of funds posed particular
problems for small and underfunded school districts, diminishing equal access
for their students.
In the Race to the Top Assessment Competition, all forty-four state
applicants and the District of Columbia were part of at least one of the two
winning consortia that agreed to develop a new generation of tests in math and
English language arts for states to use voluntarily by the 2014-15 school year.
One consortium will develop a series of interim tests administered throughout
the school year with one end-of-year accountability test. The other will develop
a series of formative assessments that will be averaged into one score for
accountability purposes.14' The new tests promise to measure higher-order
thinking skills. Yet test results are valid for assessing learning only if they are
tied to what students actually are taught, which demands a coordinated
curriculum. In the meantime, funds for research and assessment development
in other subject areas, like civics, foreign languages, and science, are given low
priority and left to state discretion as part of a separate funding stream in the
proposed ESEA reauthorization.
Aside from questions of validity and scope, there is the cost factor. Test
construction, validation, and revision of this magnitude will undoubtedly
demand billions of dollars, at a time when school districts nationwide are
strapped for funds -science labs lack equipment; history classes use outdated
books; school libraries lack technology; enrichment programs, including the
147. Sam Dillon, Winners ofAidfor Education Are Mostly in the East, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010,
at A3.
148. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., Remarks to State Leaders at Achieve's American Diploma
Project Leadership Team Meeting, Beyond the Bubble Tests: The Next Generation of
Assessments (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/beyond-bubble-tests-next
-generation-assessments-secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-state-1; Press Release, Dep't of
Educ., U.S. Secretary of Education Duncan Announces Winners of Competition To
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arts and athletics, are being cut or are based on the payment of a fee; and class
sizes are growing as teachers lose their jobs." 9
Though the Administration's strategies for improving education may
resonate among the "winners," recent Gallup poll findings indicate that the
same sentiment is not shared nationally. High grades for the President's
performance in support of public schools are down from forty-five percent in
2009 to thirty-four percent. Four out of five Americans believe that it is not for
the federal government but for the states to hold schools accountable for
student achievement. Nor do Americans support firing teachers and principals
or closing underperforming schools; rather, they prefer maintaining the
existing staff with comprehensive outside support.'
Viewed in this light, the Race to the Top and Blueprint for Reform, with
their "standards" agenda, threaten to undermine the dual promise of Brown: to
break down barriers that impede equal opportunity and to preserve democratic
government. Both plans effectively marginalize the needs of the individual
child and underscore the continued return to a state-centered system of
schooling. Despite the Administration's rhetoric of opportunity, the lineup of
winners makes it appear inevitable that urban and suburban schools, as well as
poor and wealthier schools, educate different groups of students. That
realization stands in stark contrast to the original vision of the common school
where children from "all walks of life come together to be educated under one
roof.""'
As the Gallup poll results suggest, the heavy-handed barrage of mandates
and conditions emanating from Washington defies a long tradition of local and
state control over education and raises serious federalism concerns. It uses the
power of federal funding not merely to induce but to coerce financially
desperate states into jumping onto an accelerated standards-and-testing
treadmill that remains disconnected from what is taught and leaves little room
149. See, e.g., Andrea Billups, School Budget Cuts Threaten Gains, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/11/schools-cut-budgets
-where-it-hurts-children-most/print; Stacy Teicher Khadaroo & Amanda Paulson, School
Budget Cuts Across the US Projected for Next Academic Year, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr.
20, 201o, at 4, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2010/o420/School
-budget-cuts-across-the-US-projected-for-next-academic-year.
150. William J. Bushaw & Shane J. Lopez, A Time for Change: The 42nd Annual Phi Delta
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, KAPPAN (Phi Delta Kappa
Int'l, Bloomington, In.), Sept. 2010, at 8, 10-11 (2010), available at
http://www.hcsao.org/sites/default/files/PDKGallupPoll201o.pdf.
151. RYAN, supra note 134, at 245.
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for teacher creativity or student differences."' It undermines the "partnership"
relationship that architects of the Great Society programs promised in
designing a new federal role four decades ago. And unlike the early common
school, whose key objective to preserve democracy was truly for the public
good, this slant toward economic production may not only harm some
students but also poorly serve national interests. As a recent report pointedly
stated, "America cannot be globally competitive in the 21st century .. . when
we are able to identify by race, ethnicity, gender and zip code who is more
likely to have an opportunity to learn."'
Most fundamentally, the almost single-minded fixation on productivity
undercuts Brown's legacy guaranteeing an effective, appropriate, and
meaningful education. It runs the risk of denying students -especially the most
disadvantaged- the means of self-realization through a broad-based
curriculum including the arts and literature. At the same time, it fails to equip
them with the knowledge and skills needed to compete in a global economy.
What seems to be lost on Washington is the reality of why other nations
consistently outrank the United States on the Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) exam: those nations provide students not simply
with standards but with a comprehensive, content-rich education in the liberal
arts and sciences.15 4 The now highly touted Finnish schools are a clear case on
point. In the i98os, the country closed a resistant achievement gap by replacing
state-mandated tests with well-trained teachers and "curriculum and
assessments" geared toward "problem solving, creativity, independent
learning, and student reflection.""' Though the Common Core Standards are a
step in the right direction, they are meaningless unless tied to a core curriculum
that states within our federal system may adopt at their discretion and not
under the gun of federal sanctions or denials of competitive funds.
Merely focusing on economic competition, without a more expansive vision
of schooling, also disserves the nation's position as a leader in democratic
governance. Though knowledge is essential for democratic participation,
neither the Race to the Top nor the Blueprint thoughtfully and directly
addresses this correlation, especially as it relates to changing demographics.
152. See Heise, supra note 116, at 135-41 (discussing federal inducement versus coercion in the
context of NCLB mandates).
153. SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., YES WE CAN: THE SCHOTT 50 STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC
EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 37 (2010), www.blackboysreport.org.
154. COMMON CORE, WHY WE'RE BEHIND: WHAT TOP NATIONS TEACH THEIR STUDENTS BUT
WE DON'T 13-16 (2009), http://www.commoncore.org/ docs/CCreport-whybehind.pdf.
155. LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: How AMERICA'S
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 5 (2010).
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Neither gives serious attention, for example, to the valuable linguistic and
cultural resources that children from immigrant families, now twenty-two
percent of the school-age population, bring to the school setting and the
potential for those children to bridge the global divide."' Both plans likewise
ignore the way in which mass migration is challenging notions of national
identity and increasing the importance of citizenship education in promoting
social cohesion.1s7 There is no mention of the vital role that public schools play
in cultivating the knowledge, values, and attitudes that make "good citizens" -
citizens who embrace common political principles, a shared sense of allegiance
and belonging, and a common historical memory while leaving room for
differences at the margins."' Nor are there any defined objectives for
promoting students' critical and independent-thinking skills or active
involvement that are crucial to a thriving democracy. These understandings
and capacities are especially salient for the increasing number of children who
live transnational lives, shuttling back and forth between the United States and
their parents' home countries, or whose families have little or no experience
with democratic institutions. 9 The Blueprint, in fact, eliminates separate
funding for foreign languages and civics, merging both into a larger
competitive program including the arts, financial literacy, and environmental
learning to ensure a "well-rounded education.""'
Even the early school reformers, though overzealous in promoting the
state's interests over those of the individual child, understood the connection
between education and democratic citizenship. The Court in Brown affirmed
the importance of both factors in forging a just society. As President Lyndon
Johnson noted over four decades ago "[F]reedom is fragile if citizens are
156. See SALOMONE, supra note 74, at 9; Nick Anderson, U.S. Students in the Middle of Global
Pack, WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 2olo, at A4.
157. See generally WOLFRAM SCHULZ ET AL., INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE IEA INTERNATIONAL
CIVIC AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION STUDY 13 (2010), available at http://www.ica.nl/
fileadmin/user upload/ICCS/ICCS 20o0InitialFindings.pdf (studying the ways in which
countries prepare their children to undertake their roles as citizens).
158. See CIRCLE (THE CENTER FOR INFO. & RES. ON CIvic LEARNING & ENGAGEMENT) &
CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS (2003),
http://www.civicmissionofschools.org/site/campaign/documents/CivicMissionofSchools
.pdf&pli=.
159. See SALOMONE, supra note 74, at 238.
16o. Rosemary C. Salomone, The Foreign Language Defecit: A Problem in Search of an Obvious
Solution, TCHR. C. REc., Jan. 28, 2011, available at http://www.tcrecord.org/
PrintContent.asp?Contentid=16317.
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ignorant."'"' The productivity agenda, in the end, supports neither education
nor democracy in its rush to win the global economic race.
All of this is not to suggest that the Obama Administration has turned its
back on equal educational opportunity. To its credit, the Administration has
taken up an ambitious civil rights agenda. With 102 positions added to its 2010
budget, the Department of Justice is pursuing civil rights violations on broad
fronts including education. 6 , In a March 2010 speech marking the 4 5th
anniversary of the "Bloody Sunday" march in Selma, Alabama, Secretary of
Education Arne Duncan likewise laid out the Department of Education's plans
to "reinvigorate civil rights enforcement" in the nation's schools, including
compliance reviews to assure equal access to college-prep courses and equal
treatment regarding school discipline. 6 ' The Department's Office for Civil
Rights (OCR), as of October 2010, was reviewing violations regarding English
language learners in eight school districts while the Justice Department has
opened fifteen similar investigations since January 2009.164 OCR has launched
five compliance reviews on racial disparities in school discipline while applying
a disparate-impact analysis, a course of action that some civil rights leaders
maintain was neglected during the previous Administration.16' In October
2010, OCR issued guidelines on school bullying as a possible violation of civil
rights laws.' 66 These actions, focused on educational procedures, are indeed
noteworthy and hopefully will serve as a bulwark against discriminatory
practices in the schools. Nonetheless, they do not negate equity-based concerns
over other federal initiatives, especially as they relate to conditions on federal
funding that directly affect educational quality in a more substantive way.
161. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress, Toward Full Educational
Opportunity (Jan. 12, 1965), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php ?pid=27448.
162. Byron York, Obama's Zealous Civil Rights Enforcer Gets Busy, THE EXAMINER (Aug. 6, 2010,
2:oo AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/print/politics/obamao39s-zealous-civil-rights
-enforcer-gets-busy.
163. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., Crossing the Next Bridge: Remarks on the 4 5th
Anniversary of "Bloody Sunday" at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, Alabama (Mar. 8,
2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/print/news/speeches/2o10/03/030820io.html.
164. Mary Ann Zehr, ELL Civil Rights Probes Span from Coast to Coast, LEARNING THE LANGUAGE
(Oct. 7, 2010, 2:54 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweekllearning-thelanguage/201o/io/
ell civil rights_ probes-span c.html.
165. Mary Ann Zehr, School Discipline Inequities Become a Federal Priority, EDUC. WK., Oct. 13,
20o, at 15.
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CONCLUSION
In sorting through the issues raised in current education debates, one
senses that we are living through a transformative moment in American
schooling. The affirmative move in program funding and conditions away
from equality to productivity, with direct curricular implications, is cutting
deeply into the nation's thinking on educational purposes and the federal
government's role in shaping education policy. Never before have policymakers
expected Americans uniformly to embrace "results," defined in terms of
measurable achievement, as the overarching goal of public schooling.
Looking back at other key historic moments, this turn is indeed striking. A
century ago, assimilation was the primary objective. Helping children "become
American" simply meant English language proficiency and acceptance of
society's cultural norms and political values. When the Great Society programs
changed that objective to access, the project was to level the playing field, often
by allocating additional funds so that students could effectively benefit from
programs appropriate to their needs. Both of these purposes unquestionably
have merit. Nonetheless, each standing alone and pushed to the "extreme"
ultimately proved inadequate and demanded a rethinking of the school's role in
society.16
To be sure, academic achievement is a central purpose of schooling. And
while social factors - including wealth, parental expectations, community social
capital, and family stability -undeniably affect student test scores, schools need
to be held accountable at least in part for student learning. Measuring the
quality of schools simply by the resources that they receive shortchanges the
students they are designed to serve. This is especially the case for black and
Hispanic students whose test scores remain lower and whose dropout rates
remain higher than those of their white and Asian counterparts.
Whether the Obama Administration's pending Blueprint for Reform or its
civil rights enforcement efforts will survive a politically divided Congress
remains a question. There already are signs that the now Republican-led
167. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 16o-61.
168. see SUSAN AUD, MARY ANN Fox & ANGELINA KEWALRAMANI, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC GROUPS (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/201001.pdf (examining
the academic progress made by racial minority students and the persistent challenges that
they face as compared with their white counterparts); PAUL E. BARTON & RICHARD J. COLEY,
THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: WHEN PROGRESS STOPPED 5-6 (2010), available at
http://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/PICBWGAP.pdf.
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House of Representatives will not enact the Blueprint.!"6 Yet one thing is
certain: the pendulum will continue to swing toward the pole of productivity.
As it does, we must not lose sight of Brown's dual promise to provide equal
opportunities to all students regardless of individual circumstances or group
identity as well as to promote democratic participation. As political leaders
continue to roll out achievement-based proposals, we must avoid what appears
to be a misguidedly narrow focus, understanding that schooling has multiple
purposes-not the least of which are those underscored in the Court's
groundbreaking decision.
In the end, we should strive toward designing an education agenda that
incorporates, in a measured, way the political vision of the early common
school and the social awareness of post-Brown reforms, while still maintaining
the nation's competitive edge in the global economy.
169. Sam Dillon, New Challenges for Obama's Education Agenda in the Face ofa G.O.P.-Led House,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2010, at A36.
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